Joanna Jurewicz

Fire, Death and Philosophy

A History of Ancient Indian Thinking

DOM WYDAWNICZY ELIPSA

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To Zosia
my beloved daughter

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Introduction

1. The aim of the book

This book is an attempt to reconstruct the foundations of Indian philosophy which are reflected in early Indian texts dated between 13th and 6th B.C.E. They are religious texts composed in Sanskrit which were transmitted orally in the families of priests called Brahmins[1]. They constitute the intellectual foundation of Indian culture called Śruti (*śruti*), literally, 'what has been heard'. They are generally called Veda (*veda*) which means 'knowledge'. These two names reveal a specific feature of early Indian culture that it is founded on knowledge preserved in texts remembered by priests who heard them from their teachers. For this period, we do not have other archaeological evidence of religious cults such as temples or images of gods[2]. Even if they were created, the fact that they disappeared shows that they were less important for the culture and its survival than the corpus of the Veda which has come down to us in a magnificent and well maintained condition as a literary text.

The sources forming the basis for the analysis presented in this book come from three layers of the Vedic tradition. The earliest layer is the four Vedas: the Veda of Ṛk-stanzas (*Ṛgveda*, ṚV), the Veda of Sāman-chants (*Sāmaveda*, SV), the Veda of Yajus-formulas (*Yajurveda*, YV) and the Veda of Atharvans (*Atharvaveda*, AV). The ṚV is the oldest from around 15th–13th B.C.E. It preserves many traces of the earlier Indo-European tradition and defines the conceptual frames for later Indian thinking and practice. Its role can be compared to the role of Presocratics in ancient Greece in that we witness here the beginnings of philosophical investigation which chart the pathway, both conceptually and linguistically, for the later tradition. Due to

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1 For education in ancient India, see Scharfe (2002).

2 Staal (1983, I: 94). As Kulke, Rothermund (2008[1986]: 35) write: 'The Vedic texts, and in particular, the Rigveda, still remain our major source concerning the early phases of Vedic culture in northwest India. But we always have to keep in mind that these texts express the priestly world-view of the Brahmins.'

the power of human memory, we are fortunate to have 1028 hymns, composed in a highly sophisticated way, which give us an insight into these beginnings.

While most of the Ṛgvedic hymns or stanzas were recited, some of the stanzas were intended for singing. They are gathered in the SV which comprises 1549 stanzas (Michaels 2004), primarily from the ṚV, some of which are changed due to the specific way in which they were to be sung. It also contains manuals for the correct singing of the stanzas. Composition of the SV was a consequence of the growing role of priests and ritual in Vedic ritual. It is also reflected in the YV which is divided into two schools called the White YV (*śuklayajurveda*) and the Black YV (*kṛṣṇayajurveda*). The former contains stanzas, partly from the ṚV, used in sacrifices, while the latter also explains their meaning, the meaning of the ritual implements and the actions to be taken. As they are composed, ritual becomes as important as sacred texts. Similarly to memorisation and recitation, ritual is an activity which does not leave archaeological evidence. So again we owe our knowledge of this further cultural treasure of ancient India to the power of human memory.

The AV was not included among the sacred Vedas from the beginnings of Indian tradition[3]. It is commonly known as the 'Veda of charms', though, as Brockington comments, there is not much difference between charm and sacrifice because their aims are similar (1990: 29). Moreover, the Sanskrit term, which is usually translated as 'charm', in the context of the AV is *bráhman*. The same term is used in the early Vedic text to denote the sacred word and its power. The difference lies in their use: while the Ṛgvedic hymns and stanzas were mostly used in solemn rituals destined for establishing and maintaining the social order, those in the Atharvavedic were more connected with the everyday needs of people[4].

Four Vedas, called *saṃhitā* ('what is put together'), constitute the first layer of the early Indian tradition. The next layer is constituted by the Brāhmaṇas the name of which is derived from the word *bráhman*. They are an exegesis of the sacred word and its power and, since in the Brāhmaṇas the word *bráhman* also includes three Vedas (ṚV, YV, SV), they are their exegesis as

3 Witzel (1987a, 1997).

4 But there are parts of the AV which are also connected with solemn ritual (Rājasūya), Lelli (2015). Indian tradition discerns one more layer of the Śruti which are the Āryaṇyakas, composed between the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. The distinction between the Āryaṇyakas on the one hand, and the Brāhmaṇas, on the other, is not very distinct, sometimes the Āryaṇyakas form the last part of the Brāhmaṇas, e.g. *Bṛhadāryaṇyaka Upaniṣad* is included into Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa in its Mādhyandina recension (see Keith 1989 [1925], Keith 1969, Gonda 1975c, Malamoud 1997, Houben 1991, Pataskar 2009).

well. Thus the Brāhmaṇas continue the exegetical tradition of the YV with each Saṃhitā commented on by at least two Brāhmaṇas[5].

The life of Indian priests focused on ritual and, therefore, an explanation of ritual is an explanation of their life. Thus seen, the Brāhmaṇas are proof of the basic human need to make life meaningful[6]. The composers of the Vedas were looking for the meaning of reality and that meaning is then realised in ritual. Ritual is therefore a meticulous and perceptible manifestation of the thought and speech of ancient Indians constructed in the sacred sphere.

The third and final layer of early Indian tradition that is examined in this study is the Upaniṣads which were composed before the Buddha, i.e. before the 5th century BC (Gombrich 1992)[7]. These texts can also be seen as resulting from the exegesis on the concept of *bráhman*. Now the concept becomes ontological and refers to absolute reality which transforms its aspect in cosmos and man. Reality also manifests itself as their innermost essence. Ritual activity becomes internalised as a pattern of human activity which leads towards the cognition of reality.

The first part of this book's title refers to these three layers of ancient Indian tradition. The concept of fire is the central metaphysical concept of Ṛgvedic thought (Jurewicz 2010a) and remains such until the Brāhmaṇas. However, the primary focus of the composers of the Brāhmaṇas was on the concept of death seen as a manifestation of fiery reality. It will be argued that Upaniṣadic thought could not develop without this rich earlier background, therefore the word 'philosophy' refers not only to Upaniṣads, but also covers the whole of early Indian tradition. I come back to this problem later.

The second part of the title refers to a further aim of the book, which is to present a history of ancient Indian thought. I will focus on its development and show how tradition is transformed and redefined. This approach is in line

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5 The Brāhmaṇas of the RV: *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* and *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*. The main Brāhmaṇas of the SV: *Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa* or *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*, *Ṣaḍviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* (Kauthuma and Rānāyanīya schools), *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* (Jaimīniya school). In the Black YV, exegetical texts are already included in the Saṃhitās (*Maitrāyaṇī*, *Kaṭha*, *Kapiṣṭhalakaṭha*, *Taittirīya*), the separate Brāhmaṇas are *Kaṭha Brāhmaṇa*, *Kapiṣṭhala Brāhmaṇa* (both in fragments), *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*. White YV: *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* in two recensions (*Mādhyandina*, *Kāṇva*). The Brāhmaṇa of the AV: *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*. For details, see Jamison, Witzel (2003). For the commentarial character of Brāhmaṇas, see Lubin (20100).

6 For the role of religion in making human life meaningful, see Geertz (1973b).

7 The Upaniṣads of the RV: *Aitareya Upaniṣad* and *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*. The Upaniṣad of the SV: *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (Kauthuma school), *Kena Upaniṣad* (Jaiminīya school). The Upaniṣads of the Black YV: *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, *Katha Upaniṣad*, *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. The Upaniṣads of the White YV: *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, *Īśā Upaniṣad*. The Upaniṣads of the AV: *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* (Śaunakīya school), *Praśna Upaniṣad* (Paippalāda school).

with the attitude of the Vedic priests towards their own tradition, who saw each layer as a commentary on that which came earlier[8]. We could say that they realised in practice Gadamer's concept of the fusing of horizons within the frame of which man can then meet his tradition and enter into dialogue with it (1993 [1975]). This dialogue allows man to understand himself and the world in which he lives. The Indian priests were fully immersed in their cultural heritage which, during everyday loud recitation, would have been experienced more vividly and intensely than *via* other means of transmission. I will try to reconstruct the main lines of this dialogue.

Most histories of Indian philosophy begin with the Upaniṣads and the earlier texts are only briefly mentioned[9]. The reference to the earlier tradition is limited to most explicit and late hymns of the ṚV (mainly the *Nāsadīyasūkta*, 10.129) and the *Puruṣasūkta* (10.90). The philosophical hymns of the AV are mentioned more rarely while the Brāhmaṇas are either mentioned generally or not mentioned at all. Moreover, early Vedic thought, even if it is mentioned, is treated as an example of mythological thinking and ritualistic speculations with the implication that it cannot be treated as a subject for serious philosophical investigation. In my view, this is the result of the specific bias in Western thinking which narrows the meaning of philosophy to one kind of mental activity.

True, if we define philosophy as a discipline performed with aid of reason and logic, there is no philosophy in ancient Indian thought even in the Upaniṣads. Such kind of investigation appears only with the beginning of the six classical philosophical schools called Darśanas in the first half of the first millennium B.C.E (Potter et al. 1981–2015). However, the problem in which I am interested is how philosophy began. As mentioned above, Indian tradition preserves multiple texts which provide us with the possibility of tracing back through time human endeavours for understanding the world and themselves. They are therefore of great value not only for Indological studies but also for general studies on the human mind and its ability to create philosophy. Within the scope of Indology, which is the main field of research here, my argument is that Upaniṣadic philosophy could not evolve without the efforts of earlier philosophers and that it is deeply grounded in a tradition which begins already in the ṚV.

Ancient Indian texts attest mental activity which can be called philosophical if we enlarge the definition of philosophy and understand that it is a mental activity the aim of which is to answer some of the most basic questions of

[8] See the study of exegetical strategies attested in the *Bṛhaddevatā* and its role for the later Indian canonical texts by Patton (1996).

[9] Just to mention Dasgupta (1951–1955), Frauwallner (1990[1953]), Kumar (1991), Gupta (2012).

thinking man. These include the beginnings of the world and its functioning, the role of man, the problem of evil and the problem of death. Philosophy in these terms is a conscious activity by which people try to construe a coherent conceptual structure whose elements explain other elements and which can be treated as an overall explanation of such basic questions.

It is generally agreed that abstract terms are necessary for philosophical investigation. Abstract terms refer to abstract concepts which at their broadest do not refer to immediate experience. So it could be argued that if there are no abstract terms, then thinking is not abstract. In his study of Presocratic thought, Havelock (1983) mentions such terms as being, change, time, dimension and space, body and matter and so on, which were coined by the early Greek philosophers. And it is true that early Indian texts, especially those composed before the Upaniṣads, do not contain many such terms. The question is if this means that their composers were not thinking in an abstract way that could be considered philosophical.

The problem of the relationship between concepts and language is very much discussed in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science[10]. Experiments done by Mandler and others on infants younger than one year show that it is possible to have simple concepts without an accompanying language[11]. Moreover, the concepts created by infants are abstract and general, though, of course, more detailed conceptualisation comes with acquisition of language. As far as adult human who have language are concerned, it seems that there is a group of abstract concept which may exist without linguistical expression. Such mental abstract concepts are unconsciously used in a coherent way and motivates linguistic and the bodily behaviour.

For example, the concept of category is such a concept. We can infer its existence on the basis of the fact that people are able to organise their knowledge and experience in conceptual wholes and include various elements within specific slots and create new ones. Even if a culture does not have a word for category, and many cultures do not, its participants do categorise[12]. Another example is number. Again, even if a given culture does not have the word for this concept, its participants calculate objects and they treat some objects as being impossible to count. The image schemas (VERTICALITY, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CENTRE-PERIPHERY etc., see below) which are developed in early childhood are further examples of abstract concepts which do not

[10] See e.g.: Givón (1988), Paivio (2007), Logan (2008).
[11] Mandler (1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012b, b, 2014), Mandler, McDonough (1996).
[12] See categorisation in Dyirbal language in Lakoff (1987).

have verbal expression[13]. The existence of image schemas can be inferred on basis of the way people conceive and evaluate various aspects of their experience (Johnson 1987). Yet another example is the syntax of a given language. It is a whole conceptual system of rules that govern the structure of sentences which the speakers of a given language use often without being aware of it.

In Jurewicz (2010a), I have argued that the Ṛgvedic poets had general concepts which I called general domains and this allowed them to gather various kinds of experiences into conceptual units (see also below, section 7). I have also argued for the existence of an overall metaphysical system the core of which is the concept of an internally contradictory reality called Agni the existence of which can be inferred from textual evidence[14]. The main difference between the examples given above and the abstract concepts in the ṚV is that the analysis of the latter allows me to postulate that their composers consciously created and transformed them in order to create a coherent system of thought[15].

In case of ancient Vedic texts, at least in the ṚV, AV and in the Brāhmaṇas, the situation looks as follows. At the level of linguistic exposition, these texts evoke many concrete situations which refer to abstract cosmogonical and cosmological systems. There is no doubt that the composers of the ṚV did not want to describe what happened to them in everyday life. Although they mention its elements (elements of social life and individual experience), reconstruction of what really happened to them is very difficult, if not impossible, as the ṚV is not an historical text. The composers of the AV present mantras which refer everyday life situations, but again, these situations are difficult to reconstruct. And the so called philosophical hymns of the AV are clearly far from everyday life experience, although they abound in everyday

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[13] Image schemas were described only in second half of the previous century (Johnson 1987). As far as I know, they only have technical terms created by scholars.

[14] In her monumental study about multiplicity in Indian art, Srinivasan (1997) also looks for the abstract concepts which are not expressed in language. She discerns three definitions of the multiplicity convention in the RV. They can be reconstructed because they are applied remarkably consistently throughout the whole text and are 'unexpectedly stable' (1997: 24). The basic symbolism of the convention is preserved, notwithstanding the type of deity to which it applies. Moreover, she shows that the multiplicity convention expressed by these definitions motivates in a significant way later Vedic and Hindu thought as its conceptual basis. Her study is the proof that general and abstract concepts are possible to be created and understood even if they are not expressed in language.

[15] In her research on the Ṛgvedic mantra, Findly (1989) argues that although the term *mantra* is a late Ṛgvedic concept it is possible to look for its concept in the earlier strands of the RV. As she writes: 'inattention to a term in the ṚV does not always mean inattention to the corresponding concept' (Findly 1989: 15).

life terms. Finally, the ŚB allows us to reconstruct ritual whose exegesis was one of the reasons for its composition. However, a further reason is to explain the metaphysical rationale which makes the ritual meaningful and this explanation is based on earlier metaphysical thought. Yet, the composers of the ŚB present reality in very concrete terms. Although one can see on the level of words some mutual dependence between elements of ritual and the elements of a cosmogony the ritual is supposed to explain, it is usually difficult at first glance to see such dependence on the level of concepts. It is only in the Upaniṣads that concrete descriptions appear in contexts which leave no doubts that they are being used by the composers to illustrate abstract concepts.

This peculiar feature of Vedic thinking is closely connected with the fact that the texts in which it is expressed were created and transmitted orally. One of the peculiarities of oral transmission is wording which is relatively concise by comparison with the thought expressed by it[16]. The composer of an oral text must know the ways how, using such concise wording, to make his recipient understand its richer content. The concept of script used in the investigation of oral poetry[17] is a further example of an abstract concept which is not expressed verbally but governs its creation in a structured way.

The dual-coding theory (DTC) proposed by Paivio (2007) can be useful to explain the relationship between the level of words and of thoughts in oral poetry. According to this theory, knowledge is coded in verbal and nonverbal subsystems. They are composed of representational units called logogens and imagens. These units 'are activated when one recognises, manipulates or just thinks about words or things' (Paivio 2006). The relationship between them in this respect is seen by Paivio as follows:

> The verbal system is a necessary player in all 'language games' but it is sufficient in only a few. In the most interesting and meaningful ones, the verbal system draws on the rich knowledge base and gamesmanship of the nonverbal system. Conversely, the nonverbal system cannot play language games on its own, but it can play complex nonverbal 'solitaire'. (2006: 3)

Pavio and his collaborators have been doing research on memorisation by application of the DTC. Inter alia, this has resulted in the formulation of the conceptual peg hypothesis. This has been supported by experiments

16 See Jamison (2002, 2007, and 2015). For peculiarities of Indian oral tradition, see Staal (1986), Scharfe (2002).

17 Schank, Abelson (1977, 1995), Minchin (2001, 2008, 2011).

that demonstrate that a logogen creates imagen which further activates other logogens and imagens which thereby facilitates memorisation (2007: 23, 60 ff.)[18]. Experiments have shown that concrete words and images are more effective in activating abstract content in memory than an abstract phrase. To quote one simple example (Begg 1972, quoted in Paivio 2007: 74):

> [A] concrete phrase such a *white horse* can be remembered as a single integrated image (a white horse), whereas an abstract phrases such as *basic truth* does not activate an image and therefore must be remembered as two words.

A further example of the conceptual peg is the famous madeleine sponge dipped in tea which activated Proust's memory of times past which he then proceeded to set out in his *À la Recherche du Temps Perdu* (2007: 60). Oral texts usually preserve such conceptual pegs which are meant to do the same. Proust could compose his book only because he could write those memories down. If, on the other hand, he were an oral composer, he would probably describe the madeleine sponge in more detail and only briefly mention some important moments of his life. But Proust would have to have profile the description in such a way that he could be sure that the recipient would think about 'home, garden, street, village, the pleasures experienced' and feel the feelings expected of him (Paivio 2007: 60). In other words, he would have to be a specialist in the relationship between words and thoughts as are oral composers.

Taking this into account, it is not surprising that early Indian texts are much more concrete in their verbal exposition even when their intention is to convey abstract content. This content is reintegrated and understood on the unconscious level. As Paivio argues:

> It has become increasingly clear over more than a century that much cognitive work goes on at an unconscious level, psychologically inaccessible to introspection and verbal description. (2007: 55)

Oral composition and transmission of texts would not be possible if their composers were unable to reach this unconscious level and manipulate words that make their art meaningful to recipients. As I have argued in Jurewicz (2010a), the Ṛgvedic composers went a step further as they elaborated material stored in the collective memory to build a coherent system which made life meaningful.

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[18] See also Paivio, Walsh (1993[1979]).

2. Cognitive linguistics and semantics

In order to reconstruct the abstract concepts, the way they were created and how they changed, I will use the methodology of cognitive linguistics. It is a young discipline of linguistics which began with George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's book *Metaphors we live by* (1980). Since then it has developed into an independent branch of humanities to become an important part of cognitive science. Its main focus is relationship between signs, both verbal and nonverbal, and their meanings. In other words, how such signs are construed and how they are understood. It also proposes models which reconstruct links between thought and signs.

The basic assumption accepted by cognitive linguists is that meaning is embodied. This assumption is experimentally investigated in cognitive science and psychology[19]. The outcomes of this assumption are that meaning is motivated by biological, physical and cultural experience and that this fact should be taken into account in its analysis. This assumption is especially important for the investigation of oral literature. It is everyday experience, shared by a linguistic community, which is the source of the conceptual pegs which anchors people's thinking and triggers associations. The research of Paivio and his collaborators confirms the crucial role of experience in the creation of abstract concepts such as syntax. The concept of syntax develops in early childhood by observation of motions and relations between the objects together with learning their names. As Paivio (2007: 110) puts it:

> [T]he theory suggests that the grammars first learned by children will be "tied to" the syntax of concrete objects and events… *via* the medium of imagery… and only later will more abstract grammar emerge.

This is a further argument for my claim that a text which on the verbal level seems to refer to concrete concepts does not have necessarily only refer to those concrete concepts. The problem is how to reconstruct hidden abstract ideas on the basis of their concrete verbalisation.

According to cognitive linguists, the meaning of words is also embodied. This is the first guiding principle which 'characterises a cognitive approach to semantics' (Evans, Bergen, Zinken 2007). According to the second principle, the meanings of words refer to concepts of mind more than to the external world. Evans, Bergen, Zinken (2007: 7) write that 'semantic structure… can be equated with conceptual structure'. This does not mean that they are the

[19] Johnson (1987), Gibbs (2005a, b, 2008), Tyler, Evans (2003), Hampe, Grady (2005), Evans, Green (2006), Rohrer (2007), Maaley, Yu (2011).

same. On the contrary, the conceptual structure evoked by a word is usually richer. This fact is connected with the third principle according to which words serve as 'points of access' to the repository of knowledge related with their conventional meaning (Evans, Bergen, Zinken 2007: 8). Meaning is conceptually construed in context and we could say that it does not exist out of that context. This dynamic understanding of meaning constitutes the fourth principle in the light of which 'meaning' is a process rather than a discrete 'thing' that can be 'packaged' by language' (Evans, Bergen, Zinken 2007: 9)[20].

Such an approach to meaning seems to be very appropriate as far as oral literature is concerned. Using Paivio's terminology, words are conceptual pegs which prompt the recipients to unfold the conceptual structure stored in verbal and imagery subsystems. Depending on context, various associations may lead a recipient along the concrete imaginarium, but may also lead them into more abstract and general thinking. Proper context is one of the crucial devices to realise the composer's aim. The words and phrases can be put in a context that forces the recipient to violate their everyday meaning and to look for a new one which could endow the whole utterance with sense[21]. This, in my view, is one of the reasons why the ṚV is so difficult. The words which refer to everyday experience are placed in particular contexts in order to prompt the recipient to create their new meaning which refers to metaphysical issues and thereby convey abstract content. As I will show, this was also done by the composers of the AV and ŚB. The Upaniṣadic philosophers could therefore draw on a vast repository of such concepts that had become abstract and had been coined by their predecessors.

Cognitive linguists propose three main models which allow them to reach the thought hidden in language and non-verbal signs. These are conceptual metonymy, conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending. All the models are based on the principles presented above. In order to accept the principles, and to understand the relationship between a sign and thinking, we need a theory as to how our knowledge is structured in mind and how this knowledge is activated when a sign is perceived.

We must first consider the problem of categorisation, which is now much discussed in cognitive science and its presentation would go far beyond the topic of my book[22]. Generally speaking, there are two main theories of

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[20] See also Tyler, Evans (2001, 2003), Evans (2005, 2006), Coulson (2000), Porto Requejo (2007).

[21] It has been argued that 'novel metaphors may be used deliberately by the speaker in order to force the listener to see a concept in a new perspective, whereas conventional metaphors do not have this communicative goal' (Pecher, Boot, Van Dantzig 2011: 239).

[22] Lakoff (1987), Kövecses (2011[2006]).

categorisation; classical theory and prototype theory[23]. Both agree that humans store their knowledge in conceptual wholes, but the nature of those wholes, the way they are created and the way the elements are included within them are interpreted differently. Cognitive semantics is based on the prototype theory.

Lakoff (1987) proposes that we understand categorisation as a process of creating idealised cognitive models (ICM) which are relatively stable conceptual structures stored in long-term memory. These structures constitute a mental basis which is activated when a sign is perceived and which guides further categorisation and reasoning. We do not activate our whole knowledge about Christianity (i.e. our idealised cognitive model) when we hear the word *Jesus*, but only the parts which are relevant in a particular context. When we hear this word during Christmas, we will think about his birth, on Good Friday we will think about his death. In everyday prayer, we will think about his mercifulness, in the museum, we will think about the ways he is presented in painting, etc.[24]

The parts of ICM's that are activated during the perception of a sign have various names in cognitive semantics (Cienki 2007). In order to present them, I will limit myself in two respects. First, I will limit myself to linguistic signs. Second, I will discuss the topic only as far as it is relevant for understanding the models which enable us to understand the relationship between language and thought.

Within the approach which investigates the models of conceptual metonymy and metaphor, the term 'conceptual domain' is most often used. Conceptual domain is understood as 'any knowledge configuration which provides a context for conceptualisation' (Taylor 2002: 589). In order to understand the word *tail*, we have to activate the concept of an animal and context decides if it is to be that of a dog or a dragon. This concept is called the conceptual domain. The term 'mental space' is used especially when using the model of conceptual blending and this term is explained below.

Conceptual metonymy is a model of a mental process which occurs within one conceptual domain or, more broadly, within one ICM[25]. A linguistic item is a prompt which gives us access to other aspects of a given conceptual domain or to the whole domain. It often happens that the linguistic item refers

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[23] Lakoff (1987), Croft, Cruse (2004), Kövecses (2011[2006]). Evans, Berger, Zinken (2007). For a concise survey see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/.

[24] For an interpretation of categorisation on the neural level, see Barsalou (2005a), Feldman (2006).

[25] For list of metonymies in English, see Radden, Kövecses (1999). See also Lakoff (1987), Croft-Cruse (2004).

to whole domain and is used in such a way that the recipient is triggered to activate its aspect.

Metonymy, which operates between particular aspects of a conceptual domain, is usually connected with the conceptualisation of events[26]. For example, when we hear the sentence *I like Bach*, we understand that the speaker means Bach's music and the domain is the creation of music. Metonymy, which operates between the whole domain and its aspects, is usually connected with the conceptualisation of things. When we hear the sentence during dinner *Pass me the salt, please*, we expect to get the salt cellar. This metonymy operates within the conceptual domain of salt cellar filled with salt. Similarly, the word *Christmas tree* in the sentence *Let's light the Christmas tree now* makes us to think about candles which should be lit. This metonymy operates within the conceptual domain of Christmas tree.

The concept which triggers our thinking is called 'the vehicle' while the concept which is mentally reached is called 'the target domain'[27]. The recipient of the linguistic expressions discussed above activates in his mind the target domains (music, salt cellar, candles) *via* its vehicle (*Bach*, *salt*, *Christmas tree*), but he mentally operates within one conceptual domain (creation of music, salt cellar filled with salt, Christmas tree).

Radden and Kövesces (1999) have classified the most important metonymies on the basis of data coming from English. In my book, I will use their classification and we will see that on the general level many of these metonymies also motivate Vedic thinking. Their particular realisations, however, will be different because of the different cultural and textual context.

Conceptual metaphor is the next model proposed by cognitive linguists[28]. It is a model of conceptual mapping which takes place between two conceptual domains. It enables us to think about a concept in terms of another one. For example, a cause of something can be conceived in terms of physical forces. When we hear a sentence *He pushed me to do that*, we understand that the speaker was forced to do something against his or her will. Such thinking about causality is so deeply rooted in our culture that we do not easily recognise its metaphoric character and the empirical character of the source domain.

The concept that lends its categories is called 'the source domain' while the concept that is conceived in terms of these categories is called 'the target

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26 Radden, Kövecses (1999: 30–44).

27 Radden, Kövecses (1999: 21). See also Lakoff, Turner (1989), Panther, Radden (1999), Panther, Thornburg (2004), Kövecses (2011 [2006]).

28 Theory of conceptual metaphor belongs to the vast field of research which also includes Pavio's Dual Coding Theory, the theory of linguistic co-occurrence and hybrid models (Pecher, Boot, Van Dantzig 2011, Jelec 2014).

domain'. In the example given above, the concept of physical force is the source domain, while the concept of cause is the target domain. The concepts which serve as the source domain are often more concrete than their target domains. The lists of main metaphors for English can be found in Lakoff, Johnson (1999: 49–54)[29]. The source for their classification is English. Many of them are also attested in the Vedic thinking but of course there are a lot of metaphors which are culturally specific on the general level and in their specific realisation.

There is a class of conceptual metaphors the source domain of which are image schemas[30]. The term 'image schema' has been introduced by Johnson (1987) to name the basic patterns that are acquired during early perceptual and sensorimotor experience and which significantly motivate our thinking. As he writes:

> [I]n order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order for our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. A schema is a continuous structure of an organising activity (1987: 29)

Image schemas are dynamic patterns because 'they are structures of an activity by which we organise our experience in ways that we can comprehend' (1987: 29–30). They are also flexible 'in that they can take on any number of specific instantiations in varying contexts' (1987: 30). As such they are proof of the human ability for abstraction we have from birth. Johnson gives as example image schema of BALANCE. As he says we learn this schema 'with our bodies and not by grasping a set of rules' (Johnson, 1987: 74). It is impossible to teach balance through rules. Yet, the image schema of balance becomes the source domain for various abstract concepts such as justice, harmony, beauty, health, system etc. We use it unconsciously when we set the table for a formal dinner or think that a punishment should be in accordance with the crime.

In their research in developmental psychology, Mandler, Cánovas (2014) use the term 'image schema' slightly differently to its use in cognitive linguistics. Their experiments show that the first human conceptualisation, which occurs at the age of three months, is spatial conceptualisation which involves moving objects. Mandler (2008) calls such concepts spatial primitives and shows that they are general and belong to the superordinate level of categories. Mandler, Cánovas (2014) argue that the next stage of development in early cognition is

[29] See also Lakoff, Johnson (1980: 46–51).
[30] Lakoff (1987), Clausner, Croft (1999).

representations of simple spatial events. They call these representations image schemas. The next step of development is schematic integrations which include non-spatial elements. In their view image schemas are 'the first conceptual structures' (2014: 17).

However, in cognitive linguistics this term is used in the broader sense of 'a condensed redescription of perceptual experience for the purpose of mapping spatial structure onto conceptual structure' (Oakley 2007: 215). The embodied character of image schemas is due to the fact that they arise from and are created in the very early, preconceptual and prelinguistic stage of human development. At the same time, they are abstract conceptual organisation of experience. A tentative list of image schemas has been created (Johnson 1987: 126, Lakoff, Turner 1989, Clausner, Croft 1999: 15, Hampe 2005: 2–3)[31]. We will see that many of them are attested in Vedic thinking which is not surprising when we take into account that our early development is biologically similar.

The third model is conceptual blending. This model was created by Fauconnier and Turner (1993)[32]. It is based on the assumption that construction of meaning involves more than two concepts (as in the model of conceptual metaphor) and that it consists not only in the mapping of some elements of one concept onto another, but in the integration of some elements of the concepts involved in the process. The concepts involved in integration are called 'mental spaces'. As Turner (2007: 351) defines them they are 'very partial assemblies constructed as we think and talk for purposes of local understanding and action'. The mental spaces are structured by knowledge organised by ICMs preserved in long term memory and mostly operate in working memory activating elements of our knowledge.

The basic conceptual network model consists of four mental spaces each of which has a different function. Two are the mental spaces which provide information necessary to create a meaningful conceptual unit. They are called 'input spaces' while the conceptual unit which is the result of integration is called 'blend'. It is a concept which recruits elements from both input spaces and conveys new information in comparison to the input spaces[33].

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[31] *SPACE*: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, LEFT-RIGHT, NEAR-FAR, CENTER-PERIPHERY, CONTACT; *SCALE*: PATH, *CONTAINER*: CONTAINMENT, IN-OUT, SURFACE, FULL-EMPTY, CONTENT; *FORCE*: BALANCE, COUNTERFORCE, COMPULSION, RESTRAINT, ENABLEMENT, BLOCKAGE, DIVERSION, ATTRACTION; *UNITY/MULTIPLICITY*: MERGING, COLLECTION, SPLITTING, ITERATION, PART-WHOLE, MASS-COUNT, LINK; *IDENTITY*: MATCHING, SUPERIMPOSITION, *EXISTENCE*: REMOVAL, BOUNDED SPACE, CYCLE, OBJECT, PROCESS (Croft, Cruse 2004: 45).

[32] See also Coulson, Oakley (2000), Grady, Oakley, Coulson (2007), Turner (2007).

[33] For primary metaphors as the inputs in blending, see Grady (2005).

Generation of the blend is governed by three processes. The first process is the composition of elements from the input spaces. The second is the process of completion which needs activation of elements of knowledge stored in the long term memory. The third is the process of elaboration during which the content of the blend is developed according to the principles and logic provided by the input spaces and the blend itself[34]. It is important to add that conceptual networks may have more than two input spaces and, as we will see, this happens very often in the Vedic texts.

The fourth mental space in the model is called the 'generic space'. It contains the elements of input spaces which are recognised as common. Generic space is often very schematic and devoid of the details which differentiate the input spaces and are usually much more numerous than elements which are common.

The concept of angel is a good example of conceptual blend. It integrates elements of two concepts (two input spaces): that of human beings and that of bird. From the input space of bird, the concept of wings is transferred to the blend and from the input space of a human being, the overall shape. Thus we compose the blend. However, the concept of angel has more meaning than that of a flying man. It is conceived as living being endowed with cognitive abilities. The feature of life comes from both input spaces because we know that men and birds are living beings. Cognitive abilities are transferred into the blend only from the input space of man because we know that men are (or we hope they are) endowed with these abilities. In this way, the blend is completed with elements of our general knowledge about men and birds. The generic space of the conceptual network is the concept of a being.

The concept of angel is so well entrenched in our thinking we do not realise that it is a fictive concept. But this concept is not only stored in our long term memory. Or rather, it is stored in order to be elaborated. For example, Aquinas conceived angels as possessing intelligence and power and saw them as worshippers of God who implement his will and are his messengers. A whole branch of theology called angelology was created in the Middle Ages to explain their nature. On the other hand, Wim Wenders in his movie *Wings of Desire* created an angel with the ability to experience love which finally transformed him into a human being. This is how a blended concept is elaborated.

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[34] 'Elaboration develops the blend through imaginative mental simulation according to principles and logic in the blend. Some of these principles will have been brought to the blend by completion. Continued dynamic completion can recruit new principles and logic during elaboration. But new principles and logic may also arise through elaboration itself. We can "run the blend" indefinitely' (Fauconnier, Turner 1998: 144).

Conceptual blending involves compression of relations that occur between input spaces. Fauconnier and Turner (2000) present a set of such relations among which are cause-effect, analogy-disanalogy, time, space, identity, part-whole and representation[35]. The main aim of compression is to facilitate global insight into diffuse conceptual structures and to bring complex situations to a human scale which thereby become intelligible and mentally manipulable.

Let us take as a further example the blended concept of Holy Communion in the Catholic tradition. This concept integrates input spaces which are linked by various relations such as relations of Time, Space, Analogy and Disanalogy. The Last Supper (the first input space of the network) is an event very remote from the Sunday Mass (the second input space of the network) in all these respects. Yet, in the blend, the bread and wine *are* the flesh and blood of Christ. For the believer there is no place for any quotation marks and the blend is treated as the ontological truth. All relations are fully compressed[36].

The theory of conceptual blending encompasses the analysis of conceptual metaphors and sees them as the result of integration[37]. Turner also argues that when a mapping and its expression is conventionalised and well entrenched, the generic and blended spaces are invisible, but that proper analysis will show their existence (1996: 88).

In my book, I will combine both approaches. I will use the model of conceptual metaphor in reference to conventionalised mappings between two conceptual domains. For more complex thinking, the model of conceptual blending will be necessary. Conceptual blends that are created by the Vedic authors usually consist of many input spaces some of which give structure and scenario to others. In my analysis, I will sometimes call the former 'source domains' and the latter 'target domains' in order to precisely express the mapping but it should be remembered that the mapping occurs within the blend.

All three conceptual processes are processes of which we are not usually aware. They are neuronal patters activated automatically and instantly when we perceive a sign. These patterns are created during the process of enculturation, but also on the basis of our sensorimotor activity. They can be consciously activated when we want to explain the meaning of an image or a sentence to someone who does not understand them. But even then we do not use this model, but simply explain in everyday language that when I ask for salt at the table I mean the salt cellar. Similarly, when I say that I am pushed by someone to do something, although he is thousands kilometres far away,

35 See also Fauconnier (2005).
36 For ritual blends: Sweetser (2000), Sørensen (2007).
37 Turner, Fauconnier (2003), Grady, Oakley, Coulson (2007).

I mean that he insists on me doing something. In the same way, we can explain blends. Angels can think and feel because in this respect they are like us and transformation of bread and wine into flesh and blood of Christ is a mystery that has just to be accepted.

Usually, all we know about the conceptual processes just discussed is the meaning that has emerged thanks to them. Since people are different the meaning can also be different. The fruitfulness of communication is anchored in the way we use these unconscious processes to understand each other and everything we create from day to day talks to the complex social institutions. Creation of metaphysical texts is part of this endeavour to communicate meaning.

3. The creation of abstract concepts in cognitive semantics

Research undertaken in cognitive science shows that abstract concepts are also embodied in that they are grounded in experience. As Barsalou shows 'abstract concepts are perceptual being grounded in temporally extended simulations of external and internal events' (1999: 603[38]). His experiments confirm the dynamic nature of abstraction (2005a) and the role of situation for understanding and representing abstract concepts which focus on relations, events and introspections (2005b). Moreover, 'the representation of abstract concepts is more complex, being less localised in situational content than the content of concrete concepts' (Barsalou 2005b: 134). Experiments by Prinz (2005) confirm that moral concepts have their grounding in emotions[39]. Barsalou, referring to Prinz, claims that this shows that abstract concepts are experienced directly (2005b: 133). It has also been shown that some abstract concepts can be seen in patterns of forces (Talmy 1988, 2000: 409ff).

The ability to perform conceptual operations modelled as conceptual metonymy, metaphor and blending is already proof of our ability for abstraction. At the same time, they play an important role in the creation of abstract concepts. I will now briefly discuss this topic. It should be noted that very often they co-occur in this process, but I will present them separately for the sake of clarity.

Let me begin with the role of metonymy in creation of abstract concepts. Radden (2004) shows that, in many languages, the concept of language is denoted by words which refer to the organ of speech ('tongue'), articulation

[38] See also Barsalou (2003), Ramscar, Matlock, Boroditsky (2010), Zwaan (2014).
[39] See also Kövecses (2008), Kousta et al. (2011), Cánovas (2011).

('voice'), linguistic action ('speak'), or a linguistic unit ('word'). He comments that 'these metonymic shifts allow us to access the notion of language as a fairly abstract target *via* a more tangible reference point' (2004: 1). He then reconstructs the folk model of language which comprises four levels (2004:2):

> The following four levels may be distinguished, which display increasing degrees of complexity or abstractness: (i) articulation, focusing on voice and speech organs such as the tongue, (ii) speaking, including various aspects related to speaking such as gossiping, (iii) speech, i.e. parole, focusing on spoken language, and (iv) language as a system, i.e. langue.

He concludes his analysis with the comment that 'conceptual metonymy allows us to understand abstract notions in terms of experientially basic notions' (2004: 14). Paivio gives a very simple example of metonymic abstraction, namely, the onomatopoeic *bow wow* which is the metonymic[40] extension of the vocal property of dogs (2007: 292). The child will abstract the features of all dogs into one which is the most salient. Putting this within the frame of the model of conceptual metonymy, we could say that the abstract phrase *bow wow* is the vehicle which gives the child access to the abstract concept of dog or a concrete example of it.

However, in many cases, the metonymic thinking would not be effective if it were not accompanied by metaphoric thinking. Yu (2008: 249) writes:

> 'metonymy very often is the link between bodily experience and metaphor in the mapping process from concrete experience to abstract concepts: bodily experience → metonymy → metaphor → abstract concepts.'

In her study of conceptual interaction patterns, Diez Velasco (2001/2002: 52–53) shows how metonymy gives access to abstract concepts taking as the example the expression *to have the stomach for something*, i.e. to have courage. The abstract concept of courage is activated *via* the concept of its locus *stomach*. But the meaning of this expression is also built on metaphoric thinking about qualities as physical entities which may be possessed. Moreover, *stomach* is conceived in terms of the image schema of a CONTAINER[41]. Diez Velasco claims that, 'unless we metaphorically understand *stomach* as a *container* and courage as its content, the relationship between them is impossible and the

[40] Paivio calls it metaphoric extension, but also 'kind of synecdoche'. In cognitive linguistics, these two mappings are seen as different operations and *bow wow* is an example of metonymic extension.

[41] Example provided by Diez Velasco for this mapping is *I have butterflies in my stomac*h (2001/2002: 53).

sentence (1)[42] would be meaningless' (2001: 53). Thus the abstract concept of courage is understood in terms of the contents of an actual container which is part of our body.

The role of metaphoric thinking in the creation of abstract concepts can already be seen in that its source domain is usually more concrete than its target domain. Thus a metaphor gives us conceptual access to what is abstract so that we can think and speak about it. In his study, Paivio uses the example of the term *metaphor* to show that (2007: 292)

> 'metaphoric expressions pervade even the most literal language, to the point where it is often claimed that existing languages consist mainly of words and expressions that had metaphoric origin.'

The Greek term *metaphora* originally meant 'transfer'. It is a compound which consists of *meta* ('over') and *phoreo* ('to carry'). Paivio writes: 'the literal meaning survives in that "metaphora" is the identifying label for removal vans in Greece' (2007: 292). Within the frames of this conceptualisation, the concept of a removal van is the source domain while a change in the meaning of words is the target domain. Meaning is conceived in terms of a load which is carried by a van from one place into another and words are conceived in terms of places. In the course of usage of this term in a linguistic and philosophical context, it became lexicalised as an abstract term (Jurewicz 2014).

The pervasiveness of metaphoric thinking which enables conceptualisation of abstract concepts is an important part of cognitive semantics research. It has been shown, for example, that our thinking about abstract concepts such as time is based on metaphorical relationships (Evans 2004). Özçalişkan and Stites (2013) show that the concept of motion metaphorically structures a wide range of abstract concepts, from time to mental states and that this ability is learned by children by the age of five. People will also mentally simulate actions provided by source domains even if the target domains are abstract (such as 'grasping' in *to grasp a concept* or 'stomping' in *to stomp out racism*, Gibbs, Matlock 2008). They will do it even when the motion is fictive, that is, when a sentence or expression refers to a concrete situation conceived in a metaphoric way, for example *the road goes through the park*. This means that people mentally simulate situations which are impossible in the real world where a concept cannot be grasped, racism cannot be stomped out and a road does not go. Moreover, simulation of action does not inhibit abstract understanding but rather enhances it.

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[42] *The conscripts have no stomach for a fight* (Diez Velasco 2001/2002: 52).

As mentioned above, image schema, as the basic conceptual redescription of human early experience, are proof of our ability for abstraction. Moreover, they play an important role in the creation of abstract concepts such as categories understood in term of containers or event structures conceived in terms of source-path-goal schema[43]. Moral evaluation and moral concepts are based on image schemas of VERTICALITY and CENTRE-PERIPHERY (Krzeszowski 1997). One of the most abstract human creations is music and it is structured and understood in terms of image schemas, as is shown by Snyder (2000).

Metonymic and metaphoric conceptualisation of abstract concepts is also one of the main reasons why it is possible to use signs in communication (Gibbs, Matlock 2008: 162–163):

> Imagine, for instance, that you are sitting in a restaurant in a foreign country. You have long finished your meal and want to pay the bill. Eventually, you manage to catch your waiter's attention and pretend to scribble something in the air. In doing so, you are replacing the word *bill*, or its appropriate equivalent, with an iconic gesture that you assume will be familiar to him. The waiter understands and brings you the bill. Imagine next that you have just gotten on a crowded bus and see an old friend outside on the street. She waves and you then hold your hand up to your ear as if you are holding a cell phone. As the bus is pulling away, your friend nods and does the same in return. In both the restaurant and on the bus, you do a physical action that communicates something clear and unambiguous to your interlocutor. You simulate physical actions (signing a bill, making a phone call) that are familiar and grounded in shared knowledge.

Activation of the concepts of signing a bill and making a phone call is metonymic. In the first case, the concept of writing is activated by the specific movement of one's hand, which in turn activates the complex concept of the waiter preparing the bill and customer paying for the meal. Moreover, we must have an appropriate idealised cognitive model of *restaurant* which provides us with the knowledge that it is a place where one pays for a meal. It is metonymy which operates between the elements of action in which the last phase (paying) is activated by concept of the first phase (writing a bill)[44]. The concept of writing is the vehicle while the concept of paying is target domain. In the second case, the vehicle is the concept of a telephone and the target is the making a phone call. It is also the metonymy which operates between elements of action. Again one has to have an appropriate idealised

[43] Lakoff (1990, 1999), Gibbs (2005a, b), Richardson et al. (2001), Boot, Pecher (2011).

[44] 'In our conception of events, an initial or final phase may be seen as being more important than the central phase. *to pull the trigger* for 'to shoot' focuses on an event's initial phase, *to sign a contract* for 'to make a contract' focuses on an event's final phase.' (Radden, Kövecses 1999: 49).

model about communication with the use of telephones and one has to have had experience of their usage. From my point of view the most interesting is the third gesture which is nodding. In the first two actions of writing and telephoning, a body sign replaces action. In the case of nodding, there is a movement of the body which accompanies an understanding of someone else's intention and an agreement to that which is suggested. Although the concept of paying a bill and making a phone call are already abstract concepts, the concepts of understanding and agreement are even more abstract. Yet they are being activated in everyday life *via* a very simple bodily gesture.

The cognitive research on gestures confirms the experiential ground for thinking about abstract concepts. A metaphoric gesture is a movement of hands which represents the source domain for a metaphor the target domain of which can (and often is) an abstract concept[45]. According to McNeill (1992: 14), the pictorial content of metaphoric gestures 'presents an abstract idea rather than a concrete object or event. The gesture presents an image of the invisible – an image of an abstraction.' The ability for metonymic and metaphoric thinking is the basis for the creation of conventionalised sing languages such as ASL (Wilcox 2004) or LIS (Borghi 2014[46]) or sign language in classical Indian theatre[47]. In his study of metonymic and metaphoric mappings in ALS, Wilcox (2004) shows how abstract concepts connected with thinking are activated *via* the signs which are icons for the parts of a computer. Within the frames of this conceptualisation, the mind is conceived in terms of a computer and, more generally, in terms of container (Wilcox 2004: 203–204):

> The forehead is an icon for the keyboard, which is in turn a metonym for the entire computer. The index finger metonymically represents all of the fingers of a hand that types on a keyboard. Metonymy expands from fingers on the keyboard to the working components of an electronic computer. In turn, a finger punching along the crease at the forehead metonymically and metaphorically represents specific thoughts being created by Jose's intellect. Although we cannot actually punch at our foreheads and produce ideas, we know that the physical motion of typing on a keyboard creates printed letters. This source domain of typing movements – printing words – at the forehead maps to the domain of creating ideas.

The meaningfulness of sign languages and of everyday languages lies in the way abstract concepts are structured by our experience and conventionalised in metonymic and metaphoric mappings stored in our long term memory.

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45 Cienki, Müller (2008a, b).

46 Lingua dei Segni Italiana.

47 This is a fascinating field of future research for Indologists and cognitive linguists.

Our ability to conceive abstract concepts metaphorically extends to such abstract concepts like those to be found in grammar and mathematics. Our general conceptualisation of theories in terms of building[48] allowed grammarians from the 16th and 17th century to visualise grammar. Mittelberg (2002) analyses the famous *Tower of Grammar* (Zurich 1548) and shows that coherence of this visualisation is grounded in metonymic and metaphoric thinking including those of image schemas. She draws our attention to the fact that generative linguists also conceive of grammar in concrete terms, namely, that of a tree which is an instantiation of another metaphor IDEAS ARE PLANTS[49]. As she writes,

> the *Tower of Grammar* constitutes an image of grammar using spatial and social structures, in addition to human qualities to make the meaning of abstract notions accessible' (2002: 84).

Moreover, she points out that the *Tower of Grammar* belongs to a tradition of the *ars memorativa* which created models that facilitated learning and memorisation. Its efficiency was enhanced as it combined words and images. Thus we are led back to Paivio's theory of memory based on dual-coding according to which our memory is most efficient when there is cooperation of logogen and imagen subsystems (2007). In case of oral poetry, the imagen system operates mentally, while in case of *ars memorativa* it is visualised.

Even mathematical concepts, the most abstract concepts of humanity, have their grounding in experience and are motivated metaphorically (Núñez 2007: 356)[50]:

> even the most abstract conceptual system we can think of, mathematics(!), is ultimately embodied in the nature of our bodies, language, and cognition. Conceptual metaphor and fictive motion, being extremely fast, highly efficient, and effortless cognitive mechanisms that preserve inferences, play a fundamental role in bringing many mathematical concepts into being.

Núñez argues that formal mathematical systems are not rich enough to fully grasp the inferential structure of mathematical ideas which arise from the cognitive science of mathematics (Núñez 2008: 356). In his paper, he demonstrates how abstract thinking is embodied by studying gestures used by the teachers of mathematics. Similar research was undertaken by Mittelberg

48 See e.g. Lakoff, Johnson (1980: 46).
49 See e.g. Lakoff, Johnson (1980: 47).
50 Lakoff, Núñez (2000), Winter, Matlock (2013).

(2003) in the teaching of grammatical phenomena. In both cases, teachers conceived abstract concepts in terms of source domains. The explanative role of such gestures would not be possible if we did not possess a common conceptual system structured by metonymies and metaphors which enabled us think about abstract concepts and to elaborate them[51]. Artistic creation is also structured by the metaphoric conceptualisations of abstract concepts. For example, Forceville shows how films and comics visualise abstract concepts such as life, knowledge, development and anger.

Our ability to create conceptual blends is also based on our ability for abstraction. The generic space which shares common features of input spaces is abstracted from their specific elements. As Turner (1996) shows, the generic space is often difficult to recognise, especially in the expression of conventional projections, but he argues it motivates thinking and can be elaborated, especially in artistic creativity to create a coherent story (1996: 91–92). The fact that it is often dofficult to find a linguistic expression for generic space can be viewed as a further example of mental concepts which motivate and structure thinking as concepts of category, number, syntax and image schemas[52]. Turner argues that generic spaces have an actual conceptual existence of their own and this feature enables us to project it onto various targets (1996: 86–87).

At the same time, conceptual blending is an important process which facilitates abstraction. As mentioned, blending involves the compression of relationships. One of the aims of this process is to achieve a human scale for complex situations. This enhances our comprehension of abstract concepts (Coulson, Oakley 2005: 1532–1533). In their research on early human cognition, Mandler, Cánovas (2014) show the role of blending in schematic integration, i.e. the process which involves integration of non-spatial elements into spatial events. As they argue, this process is crucial for creating abstract concepts of emotions both for infants (Mandler, Cánovas 2014) and adults (Cánovas 2010). The role of blending in the conceptualisation of abstract concepts in science and the use of gestures in teaching has been analysed by Dreyfus, Gupta, Reddish (2014), in mathematical thinking by Turner (2012) and in physics (the concept of energy) by Dreyfus, Gupta, Reddish 2014). In literary art, abstraction has been shown to be reached by blending source and target domains (Szelid 2010). Conceptual blending is also one of the mechanisms of iconicity which is another example of human ability for abstraction (Freeman 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012) Another example is painting which allows the artist to present abstract concepts like movement (Turner 2006). A lot of research

[51] For the role of image schema in scientific models, see Amin, Smith, Wiser (2014). See also Semino (2008: 125–167).

[52] Actually, the generic space is often an image schema.

on the role of conceptual blending in creation of abstract concepts in design has been done by Taura et. al. (Taura, Yukari, Tanaka 2005, Harakawa, Nagai, Taura 2005, Nagai, Taura, Mukai 2009, Taura, Nagai 2013).

4. The creation of abstract concepts of philosophy using cognitive semantics

There is ongoing research which shows that philosophical abstract concepts are also embodied. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) have shown that abstract philosophical concepts in Western philosophy such as time, events and causes, the mind, the self, morality are built on simple, often image schematic concepts, and are then elaborated in metaphoric thinking. The later philosophers tacitly assume this metaphoric system and use it in the creation of theories and arguments. For example, the Decartes' concept of intuition as a mental faculty 'to *see clearly*' in 'the *light* of reason' is based on a set of metaphors: COGNITION IS SEEING, REASON IS A SOURCE OF LIGHT, LACK OF KNOWLEDGE IS LACK OF THE POSSIBILITY TO SEE, OBSTACLES IN COGNITION ARE OBSTACLES IN SEEING (e.g. a veil which obscures an object), THE MIND IS CONTAINER, THE IDEAS ARE OBJECTS (Lakoff, Johnson 1999). It is worth noting that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to express Decartes' concept of intuition without these metaphors. This state of affair is caused by the embodied nature of our thinking in any specific instance. We would like philosophy and, more generally, science to be the exception to this fact, but as the research shows, it is not true. This does not mean that we are helpless in our search for rationality which Western thought generally considers can only be fully realised when expressed in literal statements. As Johnson (2008: 51),

> once you understand how conceptual metaphors lie at the heart of our abstract conceptualisation and reasoning, you acquire a new set of tools for analysing, explaining, and criticising philosophical theories. (…) [w]e *can* become aware of those metaphors, we can subject them to critical evaluation, and we can creatively elaborate them in developing new philosophies to help us deal with the problems that confront us in our daily lives.

In other words, we can use our rational thinking to deconstruct metonymies, metaphors and blends once we know their structure. We cannot be totally free from such operations, but if we are aware of them, we are freer. I would argue that early Indian philosophers were aware of the experiential entailment of our cognition and its influence on thinking. It also seems that they were aware that

thinking is not literal and that they could use this feature in their metaphysical endeavours. Since their metaphysics was created in supra-natural states of mind, such as when exulted with the juice of Soma or from various deprivational experiences, it was characterised by specific features the most important of which is the internal contradictions of reality. It is impossible to conceive and express such a world view through rational thinking that is governed by rules that exclude contradiction. Conceptual metaphor and blending, adequately elaborated, were the only choice for the Vedic composers. On the other hand, such conscious work on their cultural heritage makes the early Vedic texts different from myths understood as stories repeated by generations without changes motivated by a desire to compose a coherent system. I am not saying that such efforts similar to those of the Vedic composers did not exist elsewhere in the world, but rather that they did exist in early India.

The conceptual awareness of the Vedic philosophers postulated by me could have many sources and I will discuss two of them. The first is that philosophical endeavour (or an important part of that endeavour) is in practice not only based on mind but also on body.

It has been stated that thinking is embodied and that cognitive thought is also embodied. The mental practices of the Vedic composers made it even more embodied because it was part of a process which took over the whole organism. It can be seen for example in the conceptualisation of thinking in the Veda. Among many metaphors, such as COGNITION IS SEEING, an important one in the Vedas is COGNITION IS HEATING OF THE AGENT. When I keyed in the phrase *cognition is seeing* in the Google (June 26, 2015), I found many references to cognition in various contexts. On the first page of the website, there was a paper 'Is Seeing All It Seems? Action, Reason and the Grand Illusion' by Andy Clark, a paper by Pierre Jacob, Marc Jeannerod 'Précis of Ways of Seeing, the Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition', a collection of papers on perception published on the website of Department of Psychology at the Stanford University, a review of a book *Ways of seeing. The scope and limits of visual cognition* by Pierre Jacob and Marc Jeannerod, a PhD thesis in the Graduate College of the University of *Iowa Seeing God: Theology, Beatitude and Cognition in the Thirteenth Century* by William Owen Duba (2006), a paper about perceptual cognition in Nyaya-Kantian approach by Monima Chadha. There was also information about a book on cognitive analysis of perceptual metaphors for knowledge (*Sensuous Cognition: Exploration into Human Sentience: Imagination,(E)motion and Perception* edited by Rosario Caballero and Javier E. Díaz Vera). I also found information about a conference on neuroesthetic *Seeing Knowing: Vision, Knowledge, Cognition, and Aesthetics*. When I keyed the phrase *cognition is heating*,

I found several papers about bad influence of excessive heat on humans and their cognition. Even this very short survey shows that in our culture metaphor COGNITION IS HEATING OF THE AGENT does not prevail, although some verbal expression, such as *my mind is warming up*, betray this conceptualisation too. They are, however, rare. On the other hand, the concept of heating is a conventionalised source domain for Vedic thinkers and is attested already in the ṚV (Jurewicz 2010a).

Such a conceptualisation can be explained experientially. From the Ṛgvedic testimony, we can infer that Somic exultation produced a sensation of heat which led to sweating (Jurewicz 2010a: 267). My argument is that this sensation was so strong that it could become a sign for the beginning of supra-natural cognition. Such a conceptualisation is motivated by the metonymy THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE PROCESS FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS, which also motivates English speakers[53]. When the Vedic community left the regions where Soma, the plant which gave the supra-natural experience, grew[54] (see below, section 6), they began to look for ways of achieving a post-Somic state without Soma. The activity they undertook to achieve this objective was connected with bodily heating. During the time of the early Upaniṣads the practice was mastered to such an extent that it became possible to analyse it theoretically. It seems that the sensation of heating as a necessary factor to begin the practice gradually lost its value. However, its importance is preserved in the word *tapas*, which literally means 'heat' (still in the ŚB), and it then acquires an extended general meaning relating to ascetic practice[55].

The next possible reason for the specific conceptual awareness of early Indian thinkers is the nature of oral composition and the transmission of texts. It is an art present in every oral tradition and the early Indian philosophers took it a step further. They were not only aware of their conceptual heritage, but knew how to elaborate it in a way they wanted. The final redaction of the ṚV took place circa 7th B.C.E. We do not know much about the social and psychological environment of the time (see below), but it was done orally. If the composers of the ṚV had any coherent concept of reality (as I argue here and in Jurewicz 2010a), they had to use techniques they had mastered for centuries. We could say that Vedic philosophers did what Johnson proposed: they were aware of metaphors and because of that they knew how to use metaphors and transform them to create abstract theory. They were

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53 Radden, Kövecses (1999: 49), see note 46.

54 For Soma see Oldenberg (1993[1894]), Keith (1989 [1925]), Hillebrandt (1990[1927–29]). Wasson (1968), Falk (1989), Nyberg (1995), Parpola (1995), Oberlies (1998), Staal (2001), Houben 2003, Stuhrmann 2006.

55 For the concept of *tapas*, see Knipe (1975), Kaelberg (1990), Malamoud (1996b).

not 'slaves operating blindly under the harsh influence' (Johnson 2008: 51) of their metaphors. Just the opposite, they created philosophical structures from them.

My claim enriches research done in the field of oral tradition especially that of philosophical thinking. Havelock connects the beginnings of abstract thinking in ancient Greece with the appearance of writing (1983, 2006[1986]), and Seaford (2004) with the appearance of money. My research shows that none of these are essential factors in ancient India. The earliest accounts of writing date from circa 4th B.C.E (Salomon 1995, 1998)[56], the earliest coins of India dated to the end of the 6th or late 5th century B.C.E (Dhavalikar 1975)[57]. However, the cognitive approach shows that we do not necessarily need to look for the beginnings of abstract thinking in the external environment. It can be an internal work with the contents of one's mind modelled by shared experience, both human and social, that facilitated by mental practices. Such a way towards abstract thinking is expressed in the *Nāsadīyasūkta* (ṚV 10.129) the composer of which says that the relation between being and truth (*sát*), and non-being-untruth (*ásat*) is found by poets in their heart which is also the locus for thinking in the ṚV (Reat 1990).

The different paths to abstract thought lead to different models of reality. As Havelock (1983: 14) writes:

> His (Heziod's – JJ) poem is the earliest attempt we have in a style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of events, of "beginnings", that is, "birth", as his critics the Presocratic were to put it. From the standpoint of sophisticated philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter, body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity, quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless

[56] For the beginnings of writing in India, see Thapar (1966), Salomon (1995, 1998), Scharfe (2002: 12).

[57] But see also: 'The first documented coinage is deemed to start with '*Punch Marked*' coins issued between the 7th–6th century BC and 1st century AD. These coins are called 'punch-marked' coins because of their manufacturing technique. Mostly made of silver, these bear symbols, each of which was punched on the coin with a separate punch.' (https://www.rbi.org.in/currency/museum/c-ancient.html).

> present of the verb to be – the copula of analytic statement. The angles *are* equal to two right angles. They are not born that way or become or are made so.

So philosophy was concerned with what is eternal and unchanging. Ancient Greeks aimed at creation of a perfectly static model of reality. This could be the effect of literacy because written text freezes the dynamic flux of speech. Yet the reality experienced by ancient Indians was internally contradictory and constantly dynamic. It could not be expressed by a model which grasps what is eternal and unchanging because such a model would be false for them. Moreover, it seems that even within the model postulated by the ancient Greeks only assertive and negative sentences about existence of something are possible. Whenever one want to express anything more, e.g. not only that time is, but also the implications of this fact, one cannot do so without reference to metaphor.

As Havelock (1983: 21) shows, in their creation of abstract concept the Precocratics had to begin with what was available to them:

> namely, the vocabulary and syntax of orally memorised speech, in particular the language of Homer and Heziod. What they proceeded to do was to take language of the mythos and manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a cosmic rather than a particular reference

There is no place here to analyse the cognitive processes through which the Presocratics constructed their philosophical apparatus. I will limit therefore myself to a few examples of how Havelock describes shifts in the meaning of concrete words to create abstract meaning. For example, the word *cosmos*

> is borrowed from the epic vocabulary, in particular from previous application to the orderly array of an army controlled by its 'orderer' (cosmetor); but it is now "stretched", so to speak, just as the neither of the numeral one is being stretched, to cover a whole world or universe or physical system. (1983: 21).

In order to express the semantic changes conveyed by the Presocratics, Havelock uses the verb *to stretch*. He is aware of its metaphoric usage in this context, but he does this in the hope that the recipient will do the same and understand the abstract content of what is being said. The ground for his hope is the conceptual mapping which has occurred in his mind and should occur in the mind of his recipient within the frame of which a change of meaning is conceived in terms of the physical manipulation of objects. We are very close here to the ancient Greek concept of metaphor in terms of

transferring a burden from one van onto another (Paivio 2007, see above). However, Havelock's metaphor implies that this is a forceful activity as if the words kept their meaning tightly which they did not want to lose. Cognitive semantics provides the tools to explain this mysterious process of 'stretching the meaning' which enable us to analyse the process in more precise terms and understand its nature. In case of word *cosmos*, the following conceptual changes occurred.

In Jurewicz (2014), I argued that the conceptual mechanisms by which abstract concepts are created are similar to those that underlie grammaticalisation in that both processes involve metonymic and metaphoric thinking and the manipulation of context. The research done by Heine (2002) provides a useful model of the process of grammaticalisation which can also be used to analyse the creation of abstract concepts. In the first stage, the context is unconstrained and the meaning of a linguistic expression is its source meaning. When the word begins to be used in a different context (which is called by Heine 'the bridging context'), the recipient looks for another meaning of the expression which is more plausible in this context and which is the target meaning. In this stage, however, the source meaning is still easily activated. The next stage is the use of an expression in a context (called 'the switch context') which rules out the interpretation of the target meanings in terms of the source meaning. In the final stage, called conventionalisation, the target meaning does not need to be supported by the context and becomes the only meaning of a particular linguistic expression which may contradict or violate the source meaning.

If we apply this model to Havelock's stretching metaphor, we could say that he himself creates the switch context for the verb *to stretch*. He uses this verb in his paper so consistently that it becomes conventionalised and he does not have to add 'so to speak' as he does in the passage quoted above. The Precocratics did the same with nouns like *cosmos* and many others. It is worth adding that usually the bridging and the switch contexts activate metonymic and metaphoric mappings. According to some scholars, the process of metaphorisation can be seen as the process of objectivisation, that is, the process which facilitates conceptualisation of all abstract concepts (even relations) in terms of physical concepts (Szwedek 2008: 312[58]). Since conceptualisation in terms of objects causes reification this confirms, a bit

[58] 'The metaphorisation of all abstract concepts (including relations) in terms of physical objects I call *objectification.* In that theory the OBJECT refers to any material entity, including animate beings, plants and (inorganic) things'. For analysis of metaphorical models of abstract domains, see Zelinsky-Wibbelt (2000: 240 ff.).

paradoxically, that the static models in Greek philosophy is also the results of metaphorisation.

The advantages of using cognitive linguistics in any investigation of the early Veda are as follows. Firstly, it allows one to create a meta-language, so one can speak about the Vedic contents without using its concrete and figurative expressions. Secondly, it is a precise analytical tool for the deconstruction of the condensed exposition that is its content. Thirdly, its usage shows the universal character of human thought and demonstrates that the Vedic composers thought in the same way as we do in everyday life, in science, in art, and in philosophy. The search for universal aspects of the ancient Indian thinking has already been postulated by (Witzel 1979). He based his investigation on the concept of 'noematic aggregates', accepted by Hoffmann (1975/76) to analyse the rich semantics of Sanskrit words and their cultural entrenchment. The models of cognitive linguistics, developed since then, allow us to analyse the problem in more precise way.

In my reconstruction of the creation of abstract concepts in the Vedic thoughts, I use all three conceptual models proposed by cognitive semantics, namely, conceptual metonymy, conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending. The role of metonymy in creation of abstract concepts can be seen as follows. The vehicle loses its connection with the target concept and it becomes independent in that it does not activate its target domain. However, the recipient is also expected to activate the target domain and thus create a blend which consists of two input spaces. The first input space is the vehicle while the second input space is the target concept. The metonymic abstract concepts preserve elements from both input spaces, but combine them in such a way that the elements from the vehicle input space are not expected to activate any concrete reference, only its general topology and scenario.

A similar process occurs in case of metaphoric thinking. The conceptual network consists of two input spaces: the source and target domains the elements of which are transferred into the abstract blend. In both cases, the role of the generic space is very important because it links two concepts that cannot be linked on the basis of everyday experience. Thus its content comprises the most abstract common feature of both concepts. As Pecher, Zwaan (2005: 238–239) write: 'Indeed, being able to see structural similarities might be at the very core of representing and understanding abstract concepts.'

However, since the main topic of my book is history of ancient Indian thinking and not the role of conceptual operations in creation of abstract concepts, my analysis does not exhaust the latter topic. I am sure, however, that such research is indispensable preferably in a comparative perspective that at the very least involves early Greek and Indian philosophy.

5. The content of the book and basic interpretative assumptions

The repository of texts memorised by ancient Indian priests is surprisingly large. While the ṚV has come to our times only in one recension, other Vedic texts are preserved in more than one version. The full analysis of all of them would need a not inconsiderable cooperative effort. For this present work, I had to choose sources which were the most representative for the topic of my analysis.

The first chapter will discuss selected hymns of the late books of ṚV, namely, those hymns which come from the tenth book and one hymn from the first book (ṚV 1.164)[59]. The second chapter is devoted to an analysis of nearly all of the so called philosophical hymns of the AV (Śaunaka recension). The source for the third chapter are the cosmogonies presented in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (ŚB) of the Mādhyandina recension. This is a commentary to the White Yajurveda. I decided to choose this Brāhmaṇa because cosmogonies presented in it are very elaborated, in many cases much more than in other Brāhmaṇas. As far as the Upaniṣads are concerned, which will be discussed in chapter four, I will analyse selected chapters of the main ones composed before the Buddha. These are the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (BU) belonging to the White Yajurveda commentary tradition, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (CU) belonging to the *Sāmaveda* tradition, the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* (AU) belonging to the *Ṛgveda* tradition, and the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (TU) belonging to the Black Yajurveda tradition. The fifth chapter is devoted to the problem of belief in rebirth and here the sources are selected chapters of the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* (JB), the *Jaiminīyopaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* (JUB) belonging to the *Sāmaveda* tradition, and the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (KU) which belongs to the *Ṛgveda* tradition.

Such an approach allows me to see the development of concepts and language in their broader context. In researches of Indian philosophy up until today, the point of reference has been the later thought formulated in the classical Darśanas. This perspective makes scholars look at the earlier thought from one specific perspective which gives them insight to the conceptual roots of a given philosophical theory. This is clearly seen in the research done on the history of the Sāṃkhya (Larson 1969, Hulin 1978[60]). However, this approach takes the earlier concepts out of context which obscures their original meaning. The same approach is visible in the interpretation of the Vedic thought (especially Upaniṣadic) using the later Indian commentaries. Such an investigation gives us knowledge about the way the earlier texts

[59] These books are considered to be the youngest, see Oldenberg (2005[1888]), Witzel (1995a, b).
[60] See also Crangle's (1994) research on the early Indian origins of contemplative practices.

were understood by the later tradition, but not as to how they were originally understood by their composers.

I understand the original meaning as that which can be reconstructed on the basis of the wider context, contemporaneous and earlier, available to the composer. Of course, we can never be sure of the real intention of the author and how the text was understood by its recipients. It will be shown, however, that the full context considerably enlarges our understanding (Witzel 1996). It is also enlarged by the use of conceptual models proposed by cognitive linguistics which show just how many aspects of human thinking are common.

In their interpretation of the Vedic texts, some scholars seem to assume that the Indian authors were not always fully aware of the sense of their own creation. The difficult passages are sometimes explained as insertions of fragments composed at various times. The aim of these manipulations is to prove consistency of tradition, but it is done without taking care as to how such passages fit into the whole (e.g. Gotō 1986, Bronkhorst 2007: 125–126, Bodewitz 1997b: 593). However, the work of Witzel (1987a,b, 1995c, 1997) shows that the composition of the texts was a conscious elaboration of earlier tradition to make it meaningful in new, social, religious and intellectual contexts. In my view, therefore, the Sanskrit texts are worth investigation only if it is assumed they were composed by rational people who wanted to express their thoughts as clearly as possible, even if the range of their recipients was a narrow group of specialised Brahmins (Witzel 1997). When a meaning could be considered obscure, they gave keys to aid understanding which can usually be reconstructed if the broader context, both contemporaneous and earlier, is taken into account. In Jurewicz (2010a), I have shown how the key for understanding the metaphysical assumption of Agni as reality can be found if one analyses the whole hymns or the groups of hymns.

The broad context and an analysis undertaken with use of cognitive models allow us to see the philosophical character of the passages which are devoid of purely abstract terms. As mentioned, the Upaniṣads are more abstract in their exposition than the earlier texts and they have fragments which seem to be explicit in their meaning. These fragments are quoted in the studies on the history of Indian philosophy. Their context, however, is very often omitted as it is not so overt. In the present analysis, I will look at these fragments within the context of the whole chapters and books and will show how deeply they are interrelated. This approach enriches the meaning of the abstract passages and proves the rational efforts of their composers who wanted to create a coherent exposition. The earlier context will be seen to provide meaning for passages which are otherwise obscure. The same approach will be realised in case of the hymns of the ṚV and AV and the cosmogonies of the ŚB.

Classical Indological research has been grounded on a philological methodology based on the investigation of lexemes. The tools of the cognitive linguistics enrich this approach with the investigation of concepts that can be reconstructed on the basis of linguistic expressions. Research based only on lexemes has its limits, as one concept or conviction can be expressed in various ways. People store shared cultural knowledge in their memory, which is evoked by the use of various signs and different words and expressions. It will be shown that it is possible to find how some ideas, characteristic for the later stage of the development of thought and culture, are already present in the earlier strands of texts even though the specific word does not yet appear. For example, the concept of time is already elaborated in the ṚV, although the term *kālá* is what actually appears in the AV. This is also the case of *yoga*. This term in its specific meaning is not used in the early Upaniṣads, but the stages of the process are already there in general outline. The diachronic investigation of thought, therefore, requires these two explorative perspectives, namely, the research on lexemes and on concepts, and their constant and mutual crosschecking.

The fact that thought develops on two levels, conceptual and linguistic, allows one to propose a slightly different understanding of the intertextuality of early Indian thinking. It is well known that the Vedic composers repeated and rephrased passages of other texts. This is not unusual in human culture and is done not only with verbal creations but also in other forms of communication (painting and others kinds of visual art, music and, nowadays, film). Such repetitions are based on the common cultural knowledge that is shared by the members of a community. The aim is not to repeat the linguistic (or other) form, but to activate thinking about its meaning in a new context. In case of the Vedic tradition, it is usually done to highlight continuity. However, we should remember that, although the amount of preserved texts is great, there were also texts which are lost to us. Moreover, shared knowledge is often preserved not in a particular text, but in the sayings and phrases which are circulating among people of a particular community. For the convenience of exposition, we may say that a composer of a particular text quotes or refers to another particular text, but one can never sure if this is the case or if the composer is referring to something that was embedded in 'common' knowledge. For example, the definition of the name of the god Indra as *índha* is attested in ŚB 6.1.1.2 and is repeated in BU 4.2.2-3, but it is difficult to state if its composer wanted his recipient to activate exactly that passage of the ŚB or just activated knowledge that everyone knew and accepted.

Human cultures are usually based on some implicit assumptions and models which are not questioned in their most basic frame. They are treated as

ontological truths rather than just one of a number of possible ways to interpret the world. It is only now in our post-modern Western culture that people have come to realise the fragility of these frames which for some is fascinating and for others frightening. The conceptual frame of the Vedic tradition was established in the RV. It was the most important model of reality for explaining the creation of the world and the role of man. It resulted in cognition and ritual being formulated in a more or less explicit way. I have reconstructed these frames in Jurewicz (2010a) and will now show their stability while, at the same time, demonstrate the flexibility they offer which allowed later thinkers to develop, transform, redefine and often explicitly express concepts accordingly to the needs of their times. The problem which philosophers contributed to this proces, I leave for another type of research. Here I am interested in their common effort to create a coherent theory of the world and how this theory might look. It is important to note that oral preservation of texts needs cooperation and constant mutual contact of people who recite the texts together. We do not know how composition and compilation of new versions of the texts were created, but we can be sure that they were done by groups of Brahmins who manipulated texts during loud recitation. Their mind was extended in that it was kept in texts which did not exist if they were not recited[61]. The next level for extending the Vedic mind was that of ritual which embodied philosophical thinking[62]. In Vedic India, one cannot envisage someone like Kant who created his *opus magnum* in solitude in Königsberg. It was just not possible.

This most basic model of the Vedic thinkers looks as follows. Reality is one. It is internally contradictory. It manifests its aspect which becomes cosmos and man and yet, in other aspects, reality is still unmanifest. The motive of creation is self-cognition and reality cognises itself through cosmos and man. Man as such is a manifestation of reality which is able to perform self-cognition on the micro-scale. In the early strands of Vedic thought (from the ṚV to the Brāhmaṇas), man can do so thanks to cognition and ritual. The Upaniṣadic philosophers emphasise the role of cognition in this process, although they also try to present it as ritual which takes place within the

[61] For the concept of extended mind in philosophy of mind, see Clark, Chalmers (1998), Clark (2008), Logan 2008. See also Geertz (1973a: 45): 'Human thought is basically both social and public – (…) its natural habitat is the house yard, the market place, and the town square. Thinking consists not of "happenings in the head" (though happenings there and elsewhere are necessary for it to occur) but of a traffic in (…) significant symbols – words for the most part but also gestures, drawings, musical devices like clocks, or natural objects like jewels, anything, in fact, that is disengaged from its mere actuality and used to impose meaning upon experience.'

[62] Because of this each explanation of particular sacrifice begins with cosmogony.

human mind. Cognition is prior to being and results in ontic transformation of the cognising subject and the objects of his cognition. The final aim of cognition is realisation of the unity of reality.

The term 'reality' is the most abstract term which includes all conceptualisations of the Vedic composers about 'that what is'. In the ṚV, reality is conceived in terms of fire, Agni. Such a conceptualisation is valid until the Brāhmaṇas the composers of which express reality in a visible form through ritual. In the late ŚB, the term *bráhman* begins to be used to denote reality. This term becomes prevalent in the Upaniṣads. The term *ātman*, which in the Upaniṣads denotes the manifestation of reality in man and cosmos, is already used in the ṚV to denote the essence of a whole together with its outward appearance (Jurewicz 1997). In the AV, the term begins to be used in the meaning of the essence of cosmos, while in the Brāhmaṇas it is used to denote the manifest aspect of reality and the immortal essence of man built in ritual.

However, as cognitive research shows, although human beings can create purely abstract concepts, when they want to say anything more about their designates than merely to state or negate their existence, they have to conceive a concept in some way and this always includes reference to something concrete. The model of conceptual blend seems to be a very good tool to search for such conceptualisations that are in themselves abstract but which are then open to more analytic discourse. As mentioned, the model assumes the fusion of at least two concepts (input spaces). These concepts must have something in common (at least conceptually) and this common feature is called the generic space. Its isolation allows one to find the possible and most basic conceptualisation of reality.

The composers of the hymns of the ṚV analysed in this book continue the earlier conceptualisation in that they create blends the generic space of which is the appearance of the symbol of light from the symbol of darkness (Jurewicz 2010a, see below, section 7). In the late ṚV, however, a new generic space of blends appears which includes the concept of reality. This is the image schema of SELF-MOTION (Mandler 1992, 2000). The composers of the AV continue this conceptualisation. They also create new kind of blends with the concept of transformation under the influence of heat as the generic space. This concept is the basic generic space in the ŚB which in later chapters becomes a more general concept of transformation. The Upaniṣadic philosophers then create further blends, with this concept as the generic space, of which the most common blend is that of self-cognition. In each layer of the text, other generic spaces appear but they are less commonly used. The use of the cognitive tools, therefore, allows us to reconstruct the main line

of development of the concept of reality. It also confirms that even the most abstract concept is somehow framed in more concrete terms which render their analysis possible.

6. An outline of the historical and cultural background

The period between the composition of the ṚV and the earliest Upaniṣads comprises almost one thousand years. We do not have much archaeological evidence for this period, especially for that commensurate with the earliest text, i.e. the ṚV[63]. However, the texts themselves, although they were not composed as an historical testimony, can be used as sources of evidence for historical change provided they are treated with utmost circumspection. The work of Witzel (1995a, b, c, 1997) is the most recent and the most exhaustive example of such cautious investigation and in the present section, I will summarise its outcomes. In his papers, Witzel shows the complex development of the Vedic Canon, but here I will limit myself to the texts analysed in this book.

The most ancient text of the Veda, the ṚV, was composed by Indo-European tribes belonging to the eastern Indo-Iranian branch of tribes who gradually settled on the Panjab plateau during the second millennium B.C. At its peak, this Ṛgvedic civilisation extended from the Kabul River to the Gangā (Witzel 1995a: 93). The earliest hymns were probably composed around 1500 BC[64]. Witzel (1995c, 1997) discerns two stages in the early compilation of the Ṛgvedic materials. The first stage is attested in the collection of the family books (2–7) and the second is attested in the collections composed by the Kāṇva and Āṅgirasa in books 8 and 1, and the late book 10 (Witzel 1997: 264–265). The final codification of the ṚV took place possibly around the 7th century B.C.E., in eastern North India during the late Brāhmaṇa period (Witzel 1997: 265), and is a testament of the further rearrangement of the Vedic Canon (Witzel 1997, 322 ff.). It is then that the analytic version of the ṚV, in which words are reconstructed without euphonic changes (*padapāṭha*), was created and it is ascribed to Śākalya[65].

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63 Thapar (1996), Kulke, Rothermund (2008[1986]).

64 Witzel (1995a: 98), see also Oberlies (1998: 155–156).

65 The version for continuous recitation (*saṃhitāpāṭha*). For hypothesis of an early written version of *padapātha* see Bronkhorst (1982). For contestation of his approach, see Scharfe (2002: 12) who writes: 'The best evidence today is that no script was used or even known in India before 300 B.C., except in the extreme Northwest that was under Persian domination'. For the issues connected with oral and written tradition in India, see Rocher (1994). came to us in one recension ascribed to, although we know that there were others. The names of the other schools of the ṚV are *Bāṣkala*, *Āśvalāyana*, *Śāṃkhāyana* and *Māṇḍūkāyana*;

The centre of Kuru rule was located at Kurukṣetra and it comprised eastern Panjab and Haryana in the west, to upper Doab of the Yamunā and Gaṅgā in the east (Witzel 1997: 266). Information about the political and social changes which took place in this time can be found in the mantras of the additional collection of the ṚV (ṚV Khila) and the early mantras of other Saṃhitās (SV, YV, AV, Witzel 1995c: 6, 1997: 268). In the AV (*Śaunakīya* and *Paippalāda*), the first mention of iron appears which allows us to date this text circa 1200 B.C.E (Witzel 1997: 280).

The early YV Saṃhitās attest the development of the Kuru culture towards the east and the south (Witzel 1997: 299) and the growing importance of the Pañcāla tribe, "the other half of the 'classical' Vedic tribal moiety" (Witzel 1997: 301). In the beginning of the first millennium B.C.E., the centre of Vedic culture was located in Uttar Pradesh (Witzel 1997: 302–303). It is there where the texts of the Jaiminīya schools (JB, JUB) were composed.

The late Brāhmaṇa texts mention another political and cultural centre located to the east of the Kuru- Pañcāla realm which is occupied by the Kosala and Videha tribes (Witzel 1997: 307). It was located in eastern Uttar Pradesh and in Bihar north of the Ganges. On the basis of linguistic and archaeological evidence, it can be inferred that the people living in the east of northern India did not participate in the Vedic Kuru-Pañcāla culture which was imported by the Brahmins from the West and invited to the eastern territory in order to elevate the cultural heritage of the population that lived there (Witzel 1997: 307–308). One of the results of these efforts is the ŚB in its Kāṇva and Mādhyandina recensions and the earliest ritual manual the *Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra* (Witzel 1997: 315 ff.). Here the Śākalya ṚV was composed and also the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* (belonging to the White YV school) (Witzel 1997: 322–326).

The general geographical localisation of the early Upaniṣads (BU, CU, AU, KU and TU) was probably the regions of Kuru-Pañcāla and Kosala-Videha together with the areas directly to the south and west of these[66]. They were composed around 6–5th B.C.E., most probably before the Buddha.

As Witzel summarises (1995c: 4–5), the ṚV attests the free organisation of a society which was composed of many tribes which contended among themselves and with the aboriginal people over land and access to water. The second stage of development of the ṚV reflects the unification of various Ṛgvedic tribes under the rule of the dynasty of Parikṣit from the Kuru tribe (Witzel 1995c, 1997: 265). In the Mantra period, the way of living was still

see Scheftelowitz (1906), Renou (1947). For use of cognitive linguistics in research on oral literature, see Cánovas, Antović (forthcoming a, b).

[66] See also Olivelle (1998: 13).

semi-nomadic with periods of treks (*yóga*) and peaceful settlement (*kṣéma*) along the rivers and later in the interior (Witzel 1997: 266). By the late Vedic period (late Brāhmaṇas and early Upaniṣads), the northern Indian territory is divided into several kingdoms the main ones of which of which are the Kuru-Pañcāla, the Kāśi, the Kosala and the Videha.

The main social classes were the Brahmins (*brāhmaṇa*), the priests and the Kṣatriyas (*kṣatriya*), the warriors. While the Kṣatriyas kept political power, the Brahmins preserved cultural values through the texts they memorised and realised in ritual which, by the time of the Brāhmaṇas, had become very complex. The next social class was the people (*vaiśya*), peasants and artisans, while the lowest state was that of the Śūdras (*śūdra*) who were supposed to serve the three upper classes. Three upper classes could learn the Veda and participate in ritual and the Brahmins could teach the Veda and perform rituals. The Śūdras were excluded from both forms of culture. The ritual was divided into the public (*śrauta*) and the private (*gṛhya*). The former constituted the basic frames for the social structure while the latter, the description of which begins already in the AV, was connected with the everyday life of the Vedic people.

According to Witzel (1995c, 1997), the formation of the Śrauta ritual had already began during the Mantra period under the kings of Kuru who wanted to control members of the royal and priestly classes. This was the first reason for codification of the early Vedic Canon. Ritual framed the structure of society and relieved tensions, especially between the Brahmins and the Kṣatriyas, who became mutually interdependent. Although in real life the Brahmins were dependent on the Kṣatriyas and their donations, they were indispensable for legitimisation of the political power of the Kṣatriyas and for their spiritual progress during life and after death[67]. The great solemn royal rituals such as Aśvamedha and Rājasūya can be seen as the results of these efforts. The ritual of Agnicayana, which is a sophisticated development of the Soma sacrifice performed already in the RV, is a further result of these efforts.

The development of Vedic Canon was also motivated by the need for brahmanisation and sanskritisation of the territories which were gradually occupied by Vedic civilisation and 'was carried out by the well-tested alliance of the Ksatriyas and Brahmins (*brahmakṣatra*)' (Witzel 1997: 336). This affected not only the Āryan population, but also the aboriginal tribes (Witzel 1997: 297, 313–314, 323).

The next factor motivating the composition of the Canon was rivalry between various groups of priests within the Śrauta ritual. At the end of its

[67] See also Olivelle (1998).

formation, the priests were divided into four groups: the priests of the ṚV (Hotar) were responsible for the recitation of Ṛgvedic mantras, the priests of the YV (Adhvaryu) were responsible for reciting Yajus during the performance of ritual, the priests of the SV (Udgātar) performed Sāman-chants and the priests of the AV (Brahmán) prevented any mistakes occurring during ritual which could be fatal. The members of each group were also responsible for preservation and transmission of texts within their school. The growing role of the Adhvaryu priests in the post-Ṛgvedic ritual marks the first important step in the early formation of the Canon (Witzel 1997: 270 ff.). The Ṛgvedic priests aimed to preserve their role which is reflected in the composition of the speculative hymns of the AV (Witzel 1997: 293). As Witzel writes:

> To the *trayī* collections the Āṅgirasa of the AV had added their own new speculative hymns. They represent just one aspect of the ongoing deliberations on the meaning and the secret import of the new *Śrauta* ritual. (1997: 295)

As to the origination of the present version of the ŚB, Witzel presupposes (after Weber 1914[1852] and Mylius 1965) that the original 'centre of attention' of the earliest parts of ŚB in the Mādhyandina recension 1–5 is Kuru-Pañcāla territory (1987b: 196), while books 6–10 originated more to the west (1987b: 197). At the same time, it portrays some knowledge of the eastern territory of Videha. The ŚB in the Kāṇva recension (1–7) corresponds to ŚBM 1–5, but its final redaction probably took place in Kosala lands (1987b: 199). The late books of both versions (ŚBM 11–13, ŚBK: 13–15) betray knowledge of the western homeland (Kurukṣetra), but the final compilation was made in the east (Witzel 1987b: 199–200). The debates at court as to role of Janaka, the king of Videha, are a good example of possible intellectual efforts aiming at crystallisation of the Canon[68]. Let me quote Witzel again:

> when the western texts were introduced into the east (AB[69], the Śākala RV, the eastern Kaṭha texts, and PB/BhallaviB[70]), the ŚB collection was looked into by one of the many imported Kuru-Pañcāla

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[68] 'We might regard the present ŚB consisting of the two parts represented by the eastern "Yājñavalkya" section (ŚBM 1–5 = ŚBK 1–7) vs. the western 'Śāṇḍilya' section (ŚBM 6–10 = ŚBK 8–12) as a close descendant of the *original* version. However, this combined version (which includes, as an addition ŚBM 11–14 = ŚBK 13–17) has again come down in the western (Kosala) Kāṇva and the eastern (Videha) Mādhyandina versions. Both schools have revised the lost older text independently, and have then influenced each other subsequently.' (Witzel 1997: 317).

[69] *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.*

[70] *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*/*Bhallavi Brāhmaṇa.*

> Brahmins, a sort of *Veda-Vyāsa*, – perhaps Yājñavalkya himself, who quite uncharacteristically is said to directly "have received the Mantras from the Sun" and not from his teacher(s)' (1997: 328)

The early Upaniṣads were created on the eve of the second Indian urbanisation[71], when 'the large mass of texts' (Witzel 1997: 327) had already been imported to the east, collected and compiled. The rulers of the emerging kingdoms and their priests aimed at the creation of the basic concept of the Śrauta ritual which could put various strands of Vedic thought and ritual practice into a coherent system.

My analysis supports Witzel's reconstruction in that the texts that are taken into account here reflect efforts to develop a coherent version of the Canon at the conceptual level. As already mentioned, the reflection over ritual goes beyond its correct performance and basic meaning. The priests wanted to create metaphysical foundations for their activity, which would not only explain the importance of ritual, but which could also justify their high status in society. Although they did not succeed in the creation of a totally unified metaphysical system, there is no doubt that was their aim. On the one hand, they wanted to preserve the basic assumptions derived from the ṚV while, on the other, they wanted to adapt such assumptions to new social, political and religious circumstances. The Vedic testimony gives us the possibility to reconstruct the human search for making life meaningful and how this search motivates the development of tradition.

7. Fire and cognition in the *Ṛgveda*

The present book continues the research set out in the *book Fire and Cognition in the Ṛgveda* (Jurewicz 2010a). Its main claim is that the ṚV, in the final form that has survived till modern times, can be seen as attempt to build abstract concepts and models. I have shown the metaphysical assumptions which constituted the basis for the models concerning creation of the world, its functioning and the role of man. In order to do that, I had to go beyond classical philology and use the methodology of cognitive linguistics.

The main metaphysical assumption is that reality is conceived in terms of fire which is internally contradictory in that it has fiery and liquid (Somic) aspects. Reality thus conceived creates the world through a process of alternate manifestation of its aspects beginning with the Somic aspect. The functioning

[71] The first took place c.a. 2500–1900 B.C.E., the archaeological remnants of which are preserved in Mohenjo Daro and Harappa (Thapar 1966, Kulke, Rothermund 2008[1986], Witzel 2010).

of the world repeats the creation and the role of man is crucial in this process. In the morning, he pours Soma, ritually pressed and purified, into fire. Mixed with Soma, fire becomes the rising sun. When the sun reaches its zenith, the Soma of which it is comprised becomes finally purified and falls on the earth in the form of rain. At the same time man, having poured Soma into fire, drinks what remains and, exulted with it, enters a supra-natural state of omniscience, freedom and immortality. The exultation is presented as alternate manifestations of the fiery and the liquid stages. The realisation of the supra-natural state is mentally realised when the sun is at its zenith. When man dies, he repeats his ritual journey. The heat of the cremation fire replaces the heat of Soma and the deceased reaches the sun where he again experiences the same supra-natural state which he experienced during his life. Then he comes back to the earth in the form of rain to be reborn among his relatives. This cosmic and human cycle is therefore conceived, at the deepest level, as alternative transformations of the fiery and Somic aspects of reality. I have called this the general model of reality transformation.

This model was never expressed explicitly in the ṚV even in the so called philosophical hymns of the tenth maṇḍala. But the Ṛgvedic hymns are composed in such a way that it is possible for it to be reconstructed. Further, it is not only possible to reconstruct it for the contemporary recipients of the ṚV, but also by those for whom the ṚV was a basis for further interpretations, i.e. the composers of the later Vedic texts.

In Jurewicz (2010a), I have shown that most of the abstract and general concepts were rooted in concrete experience which was transformed to convey the metaphysical meaning. I divided my analysis into two parts. In the first, I reconstructed the main elements of the experience of the Ṛgvedic poets attested in the ṚV. I have called them the defining events. These are cosmic events (the appearance of the morning light), social events (war and ritual, i.e. producing fire and preparing Somic juice) and cognition undertaken under the influence of Soma. I have shown that all these events are presented in the ṚV and have the same scenario which I generally labelled as the appearance of the symbol of light from the symbol of darkness, through the destruction/disappearance of darkness. The symbols of light are not only the ultimate aim of the defining events, but are also the agents which cause the destruction/disappearance of the symbols of darkness. Conceived in this way, the defining events can be viewed as reflexive processes in which subject and object is the same. I have also shown that Agni, fire, is conceived as being the most important agent of the process and also its aim.

In the second part of the book, I analysed philosophical models which aim at a more abstract and general theory of reality. Those models are the

model of Child Of The Waters, of The Boiled In The Raw, of The Wave Of Honey, of Streams Of Clarified Butter, of The Aṅgirases Freeing Cows, of Indra's Fight With Vṛtra, of Footprints Of Viṣṇu and of The Copper Pillar. They are complex conceptual wholes which fuse several concepts and they are to some extent conventionalised and often evoked by conventionalised verbal expression. Their aim is to evoke the holistic insight into reality in all its aspects: cosmic, social and cognitive. All of them are structured by the common scenario of the defining events and, on the most general level, express the transformations of Agni. At the same time, each of them highlights different aspects of this process. Each include an image of a simple everyday situation which facilitates an understanding of the whole model and activates the understanding intended by the composer.

In my analysis, I also reconstructed the superordinate categories which I have called the general domains. These are Water and A Rocky Hill, A Vessel Filled With Liquid, Procreation, Creation Of Space, Finding The Hidden, Freeing Cows and Cleansing By Heat. They are evoked by verbal phrases or words denoting everyday experience (natural phenomena, objects and activities). Their aim is to endow complex concepts with a simple frame and scenario which will facilitates mental associations between different concepts.

I have argued that the defining events, philosophical models, general domains and the general model of reality transformation are important proofs for a tendency to abstraction and generalisation. The problem is that they have never been expressed verbally and can only be reconstructed taking into account context. Sometimes, the close context of a stanza or a hymn is enough to activate them but more often the recipient has to take the whole of the ṚV into account. Such a mental journey within the ṚV was guaranteed as text was preserved not only in the long term memory, but first of all in the short term memory as a result of constant repetition.

The ṚV is unique in Indian tradition (and the whole of human tradition) for many reasons. Its careful composition is important not only from the point of view of mnemonic values. In Jurewicz (2010a), I argue that its final composers wanted to arrange it in such a way that they could reasonably expect that the recipient would follow their line of reasoning in spite of its concise verbal expression. The composition of the later Vedic texts is less restricted and it is not possible for some of the conceptual models proposed in them to be reconstructed in as clear a form as in the RV, beginning with the AV. Some of them disappeared and some of them remained as a basic conceptual frame for thinking about reality. The latter can be divided into two kinds. The first are the models which became the cultural axioms accepted

by the members of community of the Vedic composers and formed the basis on which their conceptual edifice was built. Models of this kind were taken for granted and were not questioned as they were considered part of reality itself and not its description. The second kind are those models the aspects of which were still productive and used to conceive various processes and states. In both cases, it often happened that the concepts used in the model which evoked the experience were transformed into those which were more familiar from the point of view of the geographical and cultural environment of the composers.

The models which disappeared are the model of The Boiled In The Raw and that of The Aṅgirases Freeing Cows. The model which formed a part of the conceptual foundation is the model of Child Of The Waters. It is evoked in various ways, the most abstract being the concept of the golden egg floating on waters.

The models the aspects of which are productive can be further divided into two kinds. The first are models which are built on the basis of cultural knowledge. These are the models of Indra's Fight With Vr̥tra, of Footprints Of Viṣṇu and of The Copper Pillar. They are evoked *via* the concepts of the gods, i.e. Indra, Viṣṇu and Varuṇa. The recipient is not, however, expected to activate the whole meaning of these models as presented in the ṚV, but only their main general meaning. In the case of the model of Indra's Fight With Vr̥tra, the concept of his creative fight is evoked in order to conceive the situation of the sacrificer in those terms. The later Vedic composers also prompt their recipient to activate the concept of Indra, who becomes heated having drunk Soma, to conceive of creation and of supernatural cognition. In the case of Footprints Of Viṣṇu, the concept of the creation of space, both in cosmic terms and in the sacrificial place, is to be activated. In the case of the model of The Copper Pillar, the concept of Varuṇa and the meaning of cognition realised in ritual is supposed to be activated. In Jurewicz (2010a), I have interpreted the concept of Varuṇa's nooses as the source domain for the results of unsuccessful cognition. In the Brāhmaṇas, it is transformed into a concept in terms of which the situation of living beings, when creation fails, may be understood. However, transformation of the concepts of these three gods in the later Vedic thought and ritual needs a separate study which goes beyond the present one.

The model of The Wave Of Honey is not often evoked in later Vedic thought, but its use is well-thought-out. It is activated in explanation of the general structure of the world and society. In some places, the recipient is prompted to activate one of its input spaces which is the concept of a baby united with its mother *via* the umbilical cord. The concept of clarified butter

used in the model of Streams Of Clarified Butter is replaced by the concept of milk, sweat and gold while its meaning of cognition is highlighted.

The general domains are less numerous in the Ṛgvedic hymns analysed in this book in comparison to those in the earlier RV. Some of them became a part of the general conceptual frame of thinking about creation and cognition (Creation Of Space, Finding The Hidden), other disappear (A Rocky Hill, A Vessel Filled With Liquid and Freeing Cows).

The most common general domain used in later thought is the general domain of Procreation which is elaborated in that the concept of growth and development of a calf/child is included as its specific realisation. Contrary to the earlier Ṛgvedic general domains, it has one main target domain which is creation. In the Upaniṣads, aspects of liberating cognition are also conceived in its terms while their composers mainly activate its specific realisation of the sexual act. The use of this domain is not only explained by the universal conceptualisation of the appearance of something new in terms of delivery. It is also motivated by the cultural conviction shared by the Vedic people that the father is reborn in the son[72]. Thus the general domain of Procreation endows the target concepts and blends with the reflexive meaning thanks to which transformation of one reality can be conceived.

The next general domain which is preserved and elaborated in later thought is Cleansing By Heat. The composers of the ŚB enlarge it so that new experiences are evoked as its specific realisation. These are the boiling of water and production of cream, butter and iron. They also elaborate the concept of purification of gold. The Upaniṣadic philosophers elaborate this general domain in its specific realisation of the transformation of milk to produce cream or butter. The salt-metaphor, analysed by Slaje (2001a,b, 2002), can also be seen as a further example of the specific realisation of this general domain[73]. Cleansing By Heat has two target domains: creation and cognition.

The composers of the ŚB also created a new general domain, namely, the general domain of Cooking which includes all scenarios of preparation of food, its cooking and eating. It can be seen as the elaboration of the general domain of Cleansing By Heat but, taking into account its reach, I will treat is as a separate domain. Its target domain, is very broad and it is used to conceive creation, the functioning of world, ritual and cognition. In the Upaniṣads, its range is narrowed as it is mostly evoked in its specific realisation of eating to conceive subjective-objective cognition.

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72 Olivelle (1993: 41–46).

73 Another source domain which implies transformation under the influence of heating is metaphor of producing honey elaborated in CU 3.1-10 (see chapter 4.4.2.1).

The general model of reality transformation becomes the main metaphysical assumption as far as the internally contradictory nature of reality is concerned and it is expressed in more and more abstract ways. In the ŚB, it is conceived of in terms of the opposition of the fiery and liquid aspects of reality while in the Upaniṣads it is conceived of in terms of opposition between the subject and the object of cognition.

There is one more model accepted by later Vedic thought which is the model of creation established in the *Nāsadīyasūkta*. It is possible to discern seven stages of creation presented in the hymn.

1. The pre-creative inexpressible state (*nā́sad āsīn nó sád āsīt tadā́nīṃ*, 'There was neither being/truth nor non-being/untruth then').
2. The first act is the passage from the pre-creative inexpressible state to the state which can be expressed (*ā́nīd avātáṃ svadháyā tád ékaṃ*, 'That One was breathing breathlessly with its own will').
3. Reality inchoately divides into aspects unmanifest and manifested (*táma āsīt támasā gūḷhám ágre*, 'darkness was hidden by darkness in the beginning').
4. The appearance of the first expressible form of the manifested aspect (*apraketáṃ salilā́ṃ sárvam ā idám*, 'everything was flood without any sign').
5. The final constitution of the manifested aspect (*tuchyénābhú ápihitaṃ yád ā́sīt tápasas tán mahinā́jāyataíkam*, 'That which was about to be/that which was empty was surrounded by the void. That was born thanks to the power of heat – One.').
6. The appearance of desire for the manifested aspect (*kā́mas tád ágre sám avartatā́dhi mánaso rétaḥ prathamáṃ yád ā́sīt*, 'Desire firstly came upon that which was the first semen of thought/mind').
7. The creative activity of the poets (*sató bándhum ásati nír avindan hṛ̥dí pratī́ṣyā kaváyo manīṣā́*, 'The poets, having searched in the heart with their thinking, found the kinship of being/truth in non-being/untruth. Their ray/reins streamed sideways').
8. Realisation of the creative activity by concrete human beings (stanzas 6–7)[74].

As it will be shown, later composers generally accepted this model, although they usually began their creative accounts with the description of the first stage.

The Brāhmaṇas attest the validity of the metaphysics composed in the ṚV not only on the conceptual level. Ritual can be seen as its visible manifestation. This issue needs separate research, but correspondence between thought and

[74] Jurewicz (2010a: 58–59).

ritual is the main reason why cosmogonies have explanative value. Their composers interpret earlier thinking and elaborate it according to the conceptual and social needs of their recipients in order to express in ritual that which makes human life meaningful. Because of this the Vedic sacrifice can be treated as a model of reality. Thus the tendency for abstraction finds its ultimate realisation in activity in ritual space.

*

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Chapter One

The *Ṛgveda*

In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss the tendency for abstraction which consists on the redefinition of the concept of Agni attested in ṚV 10.81-82 and 10.121. The redefinition consists of the creation of conceptual blends. Two input spaces are the source and the target domains of metaphors which in the earlier Veda are used to conceive fire, namely, FIRE IS A TREE/WOOD, FIRE IS AN EMBRYO. The third input space is reality or its manifest aspect. In the blend, reality is conceived in terms of tree/wood, or its manifest aspect is conceived in terms of the embryo. The features of reality are imparted from both input spaces which come from metaphor. Thus the concept of fire motivates thinking about reality.

The next kind of blend, created in ṚV 10.125, is similar in its construction. The difference is that the metaphor the domains of which become the input space is a metaphor in which fire is the source domain used to conceptualise speech (SPEECH IS FIRE).

Recognition of the generic space which unites concrete concepts and the concept of reality is difficult. As I have argued in the *Introduction*, it is possible to create a static abstract concept without any reference to experience and this is attested in the early Greek philosophy. However, it is impossible to think and talk about such concepts other than to assert their existence or non-existence. So reality, in order to be explained, must be already conceived in some terms. These terms must be general enough to make them the input spaces of the blends which also recruit from experience. Mandler shows in her research that the first conceptualisation of children is spatial (1992, 2008, 2010, and 2012).

She enumerates the most basic image schematic concepts created by infants which are the earliest redescription of the spatial experience. These concepts constitute the basic network of human thinking which evolves into complex structures when language appears. I think that these most basic concepts can be seen as source domains for the abstract concept of reality in the early Veda and constitute the generic space of blends. For my research, the following image schemas are most relevant: SELF-MOTION (Mandler 1992: 593), SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CONTAINER, and CONTAINMENT. Moreover, the generic input space which unites source and target domains (as described above) also motivates thinking about reality in a considerable depth. In some blends, created in the later ṚV, the generic space is still the appearance of symbol of light from the symbol of darkness.

Then I will analyse the *Puruṣasūkta* (ṚV 10.90) the composer of which conceives reality in terms of man (*púruṣa*) and consequently uses it to present manifestation of reality in cosmos and society. Next, I will analyse the concept 'the Maker of Everything' (*víśvákarman*, ṚV 10.81-82) which is a blend the main input spaces of which are concepts of man and fire.

In the next section, I will analyse ṚV 10.72 which is similar to the *Nāsadīyasūkta*'s attempt to create an abstract model of creation with the use of abstract and general concepts. Then I will analyse ṚV 1.164 which is an attempt to describe the cognitive experience of a poet and present it within the frames of metaphysical and ritual knowledge. Finally, I will analyse the complex concept of fame, expressed by words *śrī́*, *śrávas*, *yáśas* and *kṣatrá* in the ṚV. This concept is important from the point of view of the later thought which activates it in contexts describing *summum bonum* of human beings.

I will refer to the translation of Jamison, Brereton (2014). However, since in many cases I propose a different interpretation, I am giving their interpretation in the footnotes. The quotations are from Holland, van Nooten (1994).

1.1. The blended abstract concepts. Wood, tree and embryo of the waters

In this section, I will analyse concepts which are motivated by the concept of Agni which is the result of looking for a more abstract way of expression of philosophical issues. The first are the concepts of tree and wood which is a metonymic extension of the concept of tree. It is evoked in one stanza of the ṚV (10.81.4) where the poet asks about wood (*vána*) and tree (*vṛ́kṣá*)

from which the world was carved (*nís takṣ-*)[1]. In this short question, the poet creates a rich conceptual network. Its first input space is the creation of the world which is evoked on the basis of the general context of the stanza. The second is carving or chopping. Since in the ṚV, the creation of poems is conceived in terms of carving or chopping (see section 1.6), the third input space is creation of speech. The generic space is the appearance of the symbol of light from the symbol of darkness. In the blend, the creation of world is the creation of speech and it is conceived in terms of carving or chopping. At first glance, the concept of fire is invisible. However, the concept of wood (*vána*) evokes one of the hiding places of fire (Jurewicz 2010a: 124–125), so operations on wood are operations on the fire hidden in it. The concept of fire is also evoked by the concept of tree (*vṛkṣá*) in terms of which fire is conceived as the world and its *axis mundi* (ṚV 2.35.8, see ṚV 1.164.20-22, section 1.6). Thus the recipient can add the next input space which is the transformation of fire and incorporate it in the blend. However, it seems that the intention of the poet is rather to put the concept of creation in abstract terms of transformation of a material without evoking any concrete image. This is contrary to ṚV 2.35.8 that create a concrete image of a tree with branches that grow in waters. But the conceptual link between the abstract concepts of *vána* and *vṛkṣá* and the concept of fire can easily be reconstructed.

The tenth mandala of the ṚV also attests the transformation of the philosophical model of Child Of The Waters which is the next example of the creation of abstract concepts. ṚV 2.35 presents a rich image of fire burning in waters in terms of which reality is conceived. In order to facilitate understanding of this image, the composer evokes everyday experience: fire is conceived in terms of a calf born from cows, it is licked by them and has sexual intercourse with them (Jurewicz 2010a: 207–208). ṚV 10.82.5-6 can be seen as the next step of this conceptualisation of reality towards a more abstract level (for analysis of these stanzas see also Jurewicz 2010a: 331–332):

[1] ṚV 10.81.4ab: *kíṃ svid vánaṃ ká u sá vṛkṣá āsa yáto dyā́vāpṛthivī́ niṣṭatakṣúḥ*. See Havelock (1983: 32): 'The term adopted by Aristotle to signify undifferentiated matter which constitutes the raw material of touchable body was *hulë*, the Homeric word for a forest or its firewood, or timber, the Latin '*materies*' our 'matter'. However, abstract may be the intention of this usage, its connotation is still that of solidity and touchability'.

ṚV 10.82.5-6

paró divā́ pará enā́ pṛthivyā́ paró devébhir ásurair yád ásti |
káṃ svid gárbham prathamáṃ dadhra ā́po yátra devā́ḥ samápaśyanta víśve || (5)
tám íd gárbham prathamáṃ dadhra ā́po yátra devā́ḥ samágachanta víśve |
ajásya nā́bhāv ádhi ékam árpitaṃ yásmin víśvāni bhúvanāni tasthúḥ || (6)

Was it beyond heaven, beyond this earth, beyond lords and gods?
What first embryo did the waters receive, where all the gods appeared together? (5)
Just this first embryo did the waters receive, where all the gods gathered together; the one fitted upon the navel of the unborn, where all living beings have been taken their place. (6)

As in in case of the model of Child of the Waters, the unmanifest aspect of reality is conceived in terms of water but here the world is conceived in terms of the embryo. In the ṚV, fire is conceived in these terms. This conceptualisation is also activated by ṚV 2.35 the composer of which presents fire as a calf born from cows. As the logic of the general domain of Procreation presupposes, the concept of pregnancy and presence of the embryo within the mother's womb.

Jamison, Brereton (2014) translate *samápaśyanta* as 'appeared'[2]. It is also possible to understand this word as 'to see'[3]. This interpretation allows the recipient to understand that the gods see themselves in the embryo in terms of which the world is conceived because creation of the world is creation of the possibility to cognise. The priority of cognition is preserved in the stanzas. The gods first see themselves in the embryo and can then exist within its range. If the recipient understands the embryo as fire and the sun, he will understand that the gods can see themselves and can exist thanks to the sacrifices that are performed in cosmic and human dimensions.

At the same time, the monistic character of creation is preserved. The concept of the navel (*nā́bhi*, ṚV 10.82.6c) evokes the concept of birth-giving in terms of which creation is conceived. The aspect that is born is called *ékam*. As the *Nāsadīyasūkta* tells us, *ékam* is also the name of the pre-creative reality which manifests itself in the first stage of creation (see Jurewicz 2010a: 47–48). That the pre-creative reality manifests itself in creation is confirmed in that, according to ṚV 10.82.6d, on the one all the worlds have rested. The concept of navel may trigger the recipient to evoke the model of The Wave Of Honey with its whole imagery of the wave rising from the ocean, the Somic plant growing from the soil and a child linked with its mother by

[2] In the same way understands it Elizarenkova (1999), Geldner (1957, I).
[3] Edgerton (1965).

umbilical cord. It has been shown (Jurewicz 2010a: 240 ff.) that the deepest meaning of the blend created in this hymn are the transformations of Agni. But this activation is not necessary in order to understand the content of ṚV 10.82.6 thanks to the abstract character of the description. Even the concept of a navel can be understood more generally as the source of existence linking cause and effect[4].

The input spaces of the blend created in the stanzas are already abstract. These are the philosophical model of Child Of The Waters and the general domain of Procreation. The next two input spaces are the concepts of cognition and reality. The generic space is the appearance of the symbol of light from the symbol of darkness. In the blend, the concept of water comes from the model of Child Of The Waters while the concepts of embryo and navel come from the general domain of Procreation. They are used to conceive the cognitive and the creative activity of reality.

The most abstract form of the model of Child Of The Waters in the ṚV is attested in the following stanza:

ṚV 10.121.1

hiraṇyagarbháḥ sám avartatā́gre bhūtásya jātáḥ pátir éka āsīt |
sá dādhāra pr̥thivī́ṃ dyā́m utémā́ṃ kásmai devā́ya havíṣā vidhema ||

The golden embryo evolved in the beginning. Born the lord of what came to be. he alone existed.
He supports the earth and the heaven there – Who is the god to whom we should do homage with our oblation?

In Jurewicz (2010a: 96–97), I have shown that the conceptual operations which motivated the concept of the Golden Embryo and the Golden Egg derive from the source domain of an egg with its nestling. However, the model of Child Of The Waters is also the motivating factor for the composer of ṚV 10.121 in that it endows the concepts of the Golden Embryo and the Golden Egg with metaphysical meaning. In the stanza just quoted, the context is so general that the recipient is not expected to evoke any concrete image to understand its general reference which is the creative power transforming itself into the world. Only the golden colour of the embryo betrays its fiery origin because, as we remember, the fire in the model of Child Of The Waters is also conceived as golden (ṚV 2.35.10).

The concept of the Golden Embryo, later transformed into the Golden Egg, became the main concept in terms of which the cosmos was conceived

[4] As *bándhu* in the *Nāsadīyasūkta.*

in later Indian thought. It became a purely abstract concept with no reference to experience. On the other hand, the concept of wood/tree as the source domain for the material of the cosmos has disappeared.

1.2. Reality as speech (*vā́c*)

Conceptualisation of reality in terms of speech is elaborated in ṚV 10.125[5]. It can be argued that this conceptualisation is based on the specific experience of recitation. This experience is more and more important in the Vedic tradition, and, as it will be shown, it became an important factor motivating philosophical thought in the later Veda.

Speech is conceived in terms of a woman, more specifically in terms of a queen (10.125.3a) who is able to make those whom she loves full of strength, power and poetic ability (ṚV 10.125.5cd)[6]. In order to express the relationship between living beings and speech, the composer activates the image schema of CONTAINER: speech is conceived in terms of a container in which sentient beings exist without being aware of it (10.125.04c *amantávo mā́m tá úpa kṣiyanti*)[7]. We may presume that this lack of this knowledge is characteristic for everyday cognition which can be overcome in Somic exultation. The dynamic nature of speech is conceived in terms of its roaming or walking (ṚV 10.125.1a: *aháṃ…carāmi*). As will be shown, the concept of moving is used to conceive the first manifestation of reality as free (AVŚ 11.5 and the *Vrātyakāṇḍa* (AVŚ 15) see chapters 2.2.1-2) and it is possible that reality conceived in terms of speech is also seen in this way.

The relationship between speech and gods is expressed in ṚV 10.125.1-2ab, where speech is presented as moving together with the gods and carrying them[8]. The concept of carrying activates the concept of a pregnant mother of a mother carrying a baby which is the specific realisation of the general domain of Procreation. In these terms, the dependence of the gods on speech is conceived.

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5 For similarity of the concept of speech in ṚV 10.125, 10.71 and 1.164, see Brown (1968b).

6 ṚV 10.125.5cd: *yáṃ kāmáye táṃ-tam ugráṃ kṛṇomi tám brahmā́ṇaṃ tám ṛ́ṣiṃ táṃ sumedhā́m.*

7 This foreshadows much later concepts according to which the Absolute in this unmanifest aspect knows all its manifestations contrary to them (Jurewicz 1994).

8 ṚV 10.125.1: *aháṃ rudrébhir vásubhiś carāmi ahám ādityaír utá viśvádevaiḥ | ahám mitrā́váruṇobhā́ bibharmi ahám indrāgnī́ ahám aśvínobhā́ ||*
10.125.2: *aháṃ sómam āhanásam bibharmi aháṃ tváṣṭāram utá pūṣáṇam bhágam | aháṃ dadhāmi drāviṇaṃ havíṣmate suprāvíye yájamānāya sunvaté ||*

According to verses *c*–*d* of the second stanza, it is speech which gives wealth to the sacrificer. The typical addressees of sacrifices are gods who reward human ritual efforts. So the recipient understands that speech is the main power that makes a sacrifice successful. Its superiority over the gods is also implied in that in the third stanza it is called 'foremost among those deserving the sacrifice' (*prathamā́ yajñíyānām*, ṚV 10.125.3b).

Features of speech are also motivated by the concept of Agni. In the earlier ṚV, conceptualisation of speech in terms of fire is clearly seen in the descriptions of the Aṅgirases and Bṛ̥haspati (Jurewicz 2010a: 264 ff., 379 ff.). Such a conceptualisation of speech is grounded in experiential correlation as, when one speaks, one exhales warm breath. The mechanism which creates abstraction is as follows: the target domain (speech) loses its source domain (fire) and becomes the independent concept used to think about reality, the features of fire are therefore blended within the concept of speech. The conceptual network looks as follows: the first input space is the concept of fire and the second input space is the concept of speech. The features of fire and speech are transferred to the emergent space and thus the new concept of speech is created. The generic space of this blend are concepts of heat, sound and cognition. The next input space is the concept of reality which in the blend is identified with speech. Speech, although is one of most intimate human experience, seems to be more abstract than fire because it conveys human thought and allows for communication. The generic space of this new conceptual network is the image schema of SELF-MOTION.

The construction of first two stanzas is similar to the construction of ṚV 2.1 which is devoted to Agni there identified with all gods. Each verse ṚV 10.125.1-2ac begins with the pronoun *ahám*, while verses of ṚV 2.1.1-14a begin with the pronoun *tvám*. The similarity of construction triggers the recipient to think about Agni and to identify speech with it. In ṚV 10.125.3a speech is called 'gatherer of riches' (*saṃgámanī vásūnāṃ*) and Agni is described in ṚV 1.96.6a[9] in the same way. Speech is also presented as being placed everywhere by the gods (*tā́m mā devā́ ví adadhuḥ purutrā́*, ṚV 10.15.3c) and again Agni is presented in 10.45.2b, 10.80.4d, 3.55.4.a and 7.1.9[10] in the same way. According to the fourth stanza, every sentient being eats food thanks

[9] This is repeated in ṚV 10.139.3a; here the addressee is the sun.

[10] The root *dhā-* is not used in these contexts, but the idea is the same; ṚV 10.45.2b: *vidmā́ te dhā́ma víbhṛtā purutrā́-*; 10.80.4d: *agnér dhā́māni víbhṛtā purutrā́*; 3.55.4a: *samānó rā́jā víbhṛtaḥ purutrā́*; 7.1.9ab: *ví yé te agne bhejiré ánīkam mártā náraḥ pítriyāsaḥ purutrā́*; 7.1.9c: *utó na ebhíḥ sumánā ihá syāḥ.*

to speech[11]. The reason for such a conceptualisation of speech is not only the fact that speech is produced in the mouth through which food is eaten[12], but also by the concept of speech deriving from the concept of fire which is conceived in the ṚV as the eater of food (ṚV 4.7.10, 7.7.2, 843.3, 10.15.2).

In stanzas 5–6, speech is conceived as ambivalent as it is benevolent to some and dangerous to others. Its nature then is the same as that of Agni and Soma (Jurewicz 2010a: 294 ff.). It has power to transform people, to make them powerful and strong (*ugrá*) and full of poetic ability (*brahmā́*; *ṛ́ṣi*, *sumedhā́*)[13]. In the ṚV, Agni is conceived as having transformative power as it transforms ordinary men into those who can drink Soma and it transforms the deceased into the father (Jurewicz 2010a: 294ff). Soma is conceived as having the power to transform its drinker into a seer, it is called *ṛṣikṝ́t* in ṚV 9.96.18. This power of Soma manifests especially in Indra who is transformed in a similar way (Jurewicz 2010a: 301–302, 342) . Speech is also presented as the power that stretches the bow of Rudra to kill enemies of the sacred word (*bráhman*)[14]. This evokes the destructive aspect of Agni who destroys enemies in battle and eats their corpses[15]. Also the fact that speech is presented as entering the earth and the sky (10.125.6d: *ahám dyā́vāpṛthivī́ ā́ viveśa*) shows that this concept draws on the concepts of Agni and Soma in their cosmic, solar form.

The next stanza can be seen as an attempt to settle the relationship between concepts of speech and Agni:

ṚV 10.125.7

ahám suve pitáram asya mūrdhán máma yónir apsú antáḥ samudré |
táto ví tiṣṭhe bhúvanānu víśvā utā́mū́ṃ dyā́ṃ varṣmāṇópa spṛśāmi ||

I give birth to Father[16] on his[17] head[18]; my womb is in the waters, in the sea. Thence I spread forth across all the worlds, and yonder heaven with its height I touch.

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[11] ṚV 10.125.4 *máyā só ánnam atti yó vipáśyati yáḥ prāṇíti yá īṃ śṛṇóti uktám* | *amantávo mā́ṃ tá úpa kṣiyanti śrudhí śruta śraddhiváṃ te vadāmi* ||

[12] Metonymy MEANS FOR ACTION is elaborated in ŚB 2.2.4.1 in the definition of Agni, see chapter 3.1.1.

[13] ṚV 10.125.5: *ahám evá svayám idáṃ vadāmi júṣṭaṃ devébhir utá mā́nuṣebhiḥ* | *yáṃ kāmáye táṃ-tam ugráṃ kṛṇomi tám brahmā́ṇaṃ tám ṛ́ṣiṃ táṃ sumedhā́m* ||

[14] ṚV 10.125.6a-c: *aháṃ rudrā́ya dhánur ā́ tanomi brahmadvíṣe śárave hántavā́ u* | *aháṃ jánāya samádaṃ kṛṇomi* ||

[15] Such a conceptualisation of speech can also be motivated by the concept of Bṛhaspati who is often presented as destroying enemies of the sacred word (*bráhman*).

[16] Jamison, Brereton 2014: '(Heaven?)'.

[17] Jamison, Brereton 2014: '(own?)'.

[18] Jamison, Brereton 2014: '[Agni?]'.

In verse *a*, speech is presented as giving birth to father on his head. The concept of father is used in the earlier ṚV in reference to the unmanifest aspect of reality, conceived in terms of Agni (Jurewicz 2010a: 249–250, see below, section 1.6). If speech is presented as the mother of the father[19], it implies that it is seen as the primordial reality and is prior even to Agni. At the same time, it is presented as giving birth on the head of the father. This implies that the father is born from his own head that in the later Veda is identified with womb (BU 1.4.6, see chapter 4.1.2). Speech is the intermediate element which makes the birth possible and which, conceived as female, opposes both father and son. The relationship between aspects of reality is conceived in the model of Child Of The Waters in the same ambiguous way. The relationship between speech and gods is similarly ambiguous: on the one hand, it carries them (ṚV 1.125.1cd-2ab), though, on the other, it is distributed by them within the cosmos (ṚV 10.125.3c).

In ṚV 10.125.7b, the composer resolves the ambiguity. The womb of speech is in the water, in the sea. In my analysis of ṚV 4.58.1, I reconstructed the basic ontology of the model of the Wave Of Honey (Jurewicz 2010a). In that model, Agni is identified with the ocean from which Soma arises. If the recipient activates the model, he will understand that speech is the next manifestation of the father. He will then understand the creative stages in the following sequence: Father – Speech – Father (= Agni = Ocean) – Speech. This sequence is elaborated in the models Puruṣa – Virāj – Puruṣa and Aditi – Dakṣa – Aditi (see sections 1.3, 1.5).

The presence of speech within the cosmos is described in ṚV 10.125.7cd. It extends 'across all the worlds' (*táto ví tiṣṭhe bhúvanā́nu víśvā*) and reaches zenith in the form of the rising sun (*utā́mū́ṃ dyā́ṃ varṣmā́ṇópa sprśāmi*). Agni is presented in its solar form in the same way (ṚV 5.8.7, 3.5.9, Jurewicz 2010a: 134 ff.). Within the frames of thinking just reconstructed, speech is the form through which Agni pervades the universe as the sun.

In verse *a* of ṚV 10.125.8, speech is compared to the wind (*ahám evá vā́ta iva prá vāmi*). Comparison of speech with wind is based on experiential correlation: when one speaks one breaths. Since in the earlier ṚV fire is identified with wind, the recipient again sees the identity of speech and fire.[20] In verse *b*, speech is presented as taking the world to itself (*ārábhamāṇā bhúvanāni víśvā*). Thus the burning activity of fire, conceived in terms of eating, is evoked. The blend, profiled in this way, is an important source for

[19] This conceptualisation will be elaborated in ṚV 1.164.8, see section 1.6.

[20] ṚV 7.3.2, see also ṚV 1.148.4, 4.7.10, 10.142.4. Agni is called 'wind' in ṚV 6.4.7. Agni is compared to wind in ṚV 7.5.7, 10.46.7. Agni breathes (*śvas*-) in ṚV 1.65.9, 1.140.5. Agni is called 'breath' (*prāṇá*) in ṚV 1.66. (Jurewicz 2010a: 266, note 30).

the conceptualisation of the creative activity of reality in AU 1.3.10 within its manifest aspect (see chapter 4.1.3). The second hemistich of the last stanza presents speech as identical with the unmanifest aspect: it extends beyond the sky and the earth[21].

From the diachronic view, identification of reality with speech and the way of thinking about it is motivated by the concept of Agni. In the earlier parts of the ṚV, reality is conceived in terms of fire that burns, speaks, is omnipresent and is ambivalent. Speech has the same features. At the same time, to conceive reality in terms of speech is proof of abstraction. Reality, conceived in terms of speech, is dynamic and cognitive.

From the synchronic view, the concept of speech in the ṚV 10.125 is a blend of features of Agni and of speech. The features of Agni are based on the way it is conceived in the ṚV, on the metaphors of its activity, on its role it plays in society and cosmos and on its metaphysic conceptualisation. The features of speech are also based on its metaphoric conceptualisation, especially in terms of woman/queen/mother. Those features are transferred into the blend to create a metaphysical concept of reality. The input spaces of Agni and speech endow the concept of reality with meanings of cognition while the conceptualisation of speech in terms of a woman imparts to the blend the concept of agency. The generic space which unites those input spaces with the input space of reality is the image schema of SELF-MOTION.

1.3. Man is the measure of all things (RV 10.90)

The *Puruṣasūkta* begins a long and well established tradition in Indian philosophy to conceive of reality in terms of man (*púruṣa*). This hymn can be seen as the explicit verbalisation of Ṛgvedic thinking about reality in such terms. It is possible that conceptualisation of reality in terms of a man is motivated by the concept of Agni which is conceived as a man, principally as a poet, a priest and a messenger[22]. The concept of man is also implicitly evoked by the *Nāsadīyasūkta via* the concepts of cognition and procreation in terms of which the creative process is conceived (metonymy ACTION FOR AGENT, Jurewicz 2010a: 45 ff.[23]). Mus (1968) looks for reasons for this conceptualisation in the historical context and in contemporary political and

[21] ṚV 10.125.8: *ahám evá vā́ta iva prá vāmi ārábhamāṇā bhúvanāni víśvā | paró divā́ pará enā́ pr̥thivyā́ etā́vatī mahinā́ sám babhūva* ||

[22] Already Brown (1931: 109–110) has shown that the concept of *púruṣa* shares features with the earlier concept of Agni and Sūrya.

[23] Radden, Kövecses (1990). See Jurewicz (2010a: 45 ff.).

social changes. The Brahmins and the Kṣatriyas needed an established alliance between spiritual power (*bráhman*) and secular power (*kṣatrá*) and a clearer concept of a society which was becoming more and more complex.

The composer of the *Puruṣasūkta*, on the one hand, evokes the domains used by the *Nāsadīyasūkta* and, on the other, he elaborates the concept of the sacrifice. As it will be shown, while the first five stanzas present creation the main schema of which agrees with that of the *Nāsadīyasūkta*, the remaining stanzas of the hymn introduce a new perspective which allows the composer to define ontology and anthropology in a different way. This reflects the social changes that took place in the Āryan society as far as ritual is concerned. It had become more complex and had begun to play the role of a common activity that organised all of society. The main input spaces of the conceptual network created by the composer are concepts of man and of reality. The third input space is the cosmos understood in the blend as the manifest aspect of reality. The generic space is the concept of transformation.

ṚV 10.90.1

sahásraśīrṣā púruṣaḥ sahasrākṣáḥ sahásrapāt |
sá *bhúmiṃ viśváto vṛtvā́* áty *atiṣṭhad daśāṅgulám* ||

The Man has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet.
Having covered the earth on all sides, he extended ten fingers' breadth beyond.

Contrary to the *Nāsadīyasūkta*, here the composer begins his description with a positive statement, although the content of the statement is paradoxical: it is the image of a man with a thousand heads, eyes and feet. The first act of creation is conceived in the *Nāsadīyasūkta* in a similarly paradoxical way (Jurewicz 2010a). Since, in everyday life, there is no living being which could have a thousand heads and feet, the recipient understands that this impossible concept expresses the paradoxical nature of reality. The number 'thousand' is probably meant to metonymically evoke the concept of infinity[24]. If this is the case, the recipient understands that reality manifests itself as infinite. The concept of the head metonymically evokes the concept of thinking, the concept of eye evokes it metonymically (PART OF THE BODY FOR ACTION[25]) and metaphorically (COGNITION IS SEEING[26]). So from the man having a thousand heads and eyes, the recipient can understand that reality

[24] Srinivasan (1997: 75): '1,000 = totality of numbers of things; completeness prior to the introduction of distinction'.

[25] This metonymy can be seen as an instantiation of the metonymy MEANS FOR ACTION (as in the sentence *He sneezed the tissue off the* table, Radden, Kövecses 1999: 37).

[26] For the importance of this metaphor in the ṚV, see Gonda (1963: 28 ff. *passim*).

is omniscient. From the man also having a thousand feet, the recipient can understand that reality is omnipresent: omnipresence is conceived in terms of the ability to go everywhere at the same time[27] and he may infer from it that, in the first act of creation, reality begins to move. In the same way, speech is conceived in ṚV 10.125.1a with use of the source domain of walking (see section 1.2). Moreover, the ability to go everywhere implies a lack of restriction. On this basis, the recipient can understand that reality manifests itself as free (FREEDOM IS LACK OF BONDAGE)[28]. The first manifestation of reality in the *Nāsadīyasūkta* is conceived in the same way, although with the use of a different concept of breathing without breath (Jurewicz 2010a: 46–48). Such a conceptualisation of the first manifestation of reality is continued in AVŚ 11.5 and 15.1 (see chapters 2.2.1-2).

The earth in verses *c*–*d* is the source domain for the conceptualisation of the world in its pre-creative state[29]. It is presented as being encompassed by reality. In the same way, the composer describes the next stage of creation. This is conceived similarly to the *Nāsadīyasūkta* which presents it as darkness hiding darkness (*táma āsīt támasā gūḷhám ágre*, Jurewicz 2010a: 48–49). The verb *vṛ-* (*vṛtvā́*) evokes the concept of Vṛtra who is the embodiment of the power that hides the future world. In Jurewicz (2010a: 343 ff.), it is shown that, in the descriptions of the fight of Indra with Vṛtra, the appearance of Vṛtra corresponds to the second stage of creation in the model of the *Nāsadīyasūkta*. Moreover, if the recipient activates the concept of Vṛtra here, he may interpret the thousand-headed and thousand-feet being as a monster which in the second stage of creation manifests its destroying power[30].

In the interpretation of *daśāṅgulám*, I follow the interpretation of Coomaraswamy (1941) and Mus (1968)[31] who argue that this expression refers to the measure of face. According to Mus (1968: 548–549), its upper part measures ten fingers while the lower jaw measures two fingers. This interpretation implies that, in order to understand the state described in the stanza, the recipient must think about the head of man and conceive reality in these terms; the concepts of head and of reality are the input space of this conceptual network. The conceptualisation can be run in the blend in two ways. According to the first interpretation, the upper immovable part of the head is

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27 Expressed by later *sarvagata*.

28 Lakoff (1987: 274): 'Slavery is understood as bondage, and freedom as the absence of anything tying us down'.

29 In ŚB 2.2.4.3 the pre-creative state of the world is conceived in terms of the bald earth, see chapter 3.1.1.

30 See Coomaraswamy (1935). This is the case in some cosmogonies of the ŚB, see chapter 3.1.

31 See also Jamison, Brereton (2014: 1538). Brown (1931) and Coomaraswamy (1946) interpret *áty atiṣṭhad* as 'ruled over'. According to Brown (1931), *daśangulám* refers to 'heart'.

the unmanifest aspect of reality while its lower movable part and the space which is created when mouth is open, is the manifest one. According to the second interpretation, the upper immovable part is the borderline sphere of the cosmos reached in sacrifice while the whole body is the unmanifest aspect[32]. The generic input space is the concept of the image schema of CONTAINER. In the blend, the creation is conceived in terms of man who opens his mouth in order to speak or to eat; the existence of the world is conceived in terms of speaking and eating[33]. This again brings us back to the concept of Agni whose burning is conceived in these terms. Moreover, this foreshadows later metaphysical concepts of the ŚB.

ṚV 10.90.2

púruṣa evédáṃ sárvaṃ yád bhūtáṃ yác ca bháviyam |
utā́mṛtatvásyéśāno yád ánnenātiróhati ||

The Man is this whole[34]: what has come into being been and what is to be.
Moreover, he is master of immortality when he climbs beyond[35] through food.

Already in the ṚV, the expression *idáṃ sárvam* (verse *a*) refers to the manifest world[36] so, in verse *a*, the composer identifies reality with its creation. In this way, the monistic assumption is expressed. According to verse *b*, reality is what has come to being and what is to be (*yád bhūtáṃ yác ca bháviyam*), i.e. it is subject to the influence of time. The concept of time is not yet expressed verbally (it will be in AVŚ 19.53, see chapter 2.1.3), but clearly it exists in the mind of composer. The concept of time is the consequence of the conceptualisation of the manifest aspect in terms of a moving jaw which metonymically activates concepts of speaking and eating. From everyday experience, the recipient knows that any activity occurs in time.

In verse *c*, reality is called 'the master of immortality' (*amṛtatvásyéśāno*) which implies that reality is beyond the influence of time. There two possible interpretations of this expression. The first is that it refers to the unmanifest aspect of reality. However, the composer states in verse *d*, that the stage of immortality can be gained thanks to food (*yád ánnenātiróhati*).

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[32] In this way, it is interpreted in ŚB 6.1.1, see chapter 3.2.2.

[33] Here I would see the roots of the AU conceptualisation of the beginnings of the creative process in terms of an egg which appears from an open mouth (see chapter 4.1.3). The earth covered by man from all sides may evoke the image of an egg kept in a mouth.

[34] Jamison, Brereton 2014: '(world)'.

[35] Jamison, Brereton 2014: '(this world)'.

[36] ṚV 8.58.2: *éka evā́gnír bahudhā́ sámiddha ékaḥ sū́ryo víśvam ánu prábhūtaḥ | ékaivóṣā́ḥ sárvam idáṃ ví bhāti ékaṃ vā́ idáṃ ví babhūva sárvam ||*

As I have already mentioned (see *Introduction*), in the early Veda the range of philosophical interest was limited to what is manifest (*sát*), the sphere that can be defined and experienced. Although the composers assumed the existence of the unmanifest aspect of reality, which is the source of the world, they did not explore it mentally. However, they accepted the existence of the sphere within the manifest aspect, which is beyond everyday life experience, but which can be acquired in Somic exultation. It is conceptualised in the ṚV as being realised on the sun. The sun is the visible form of the highest heaven, *paramá vyòman*, which is the borderline sphere of the cosmos seen as the spatio-temporal beginnings of the world (Jurewicz 2010a: 296 ff.)[37]. However, as I have also mentioned in the *Introduction*, in the late Veda the composers begin to recognise more clearly this sphere and see it as the borderline sphere of the cosmos which is manifest but not subjected to limitation of everyday life experience. The expression 'the master of immortality' (*amṛ́tatvásyéśāno*) may refer to this very sphere. In the ṚV, the concept of immortality (*amrtatvá*) metonymically activates the concept of the sun in zenith filled with Somic juice which is gained by men during sacrifice (STATE FOR THE PLACE THE STATE IS REALISED[38]). According to this interpretation, death and immortality belong to the manifest aspect of reality which is divided into two parts: the part subjected to time (the earth), and the part where immortality is gained (the sun filled with heavenly Soma). Thus the recipient understands that reality, in the creative act, manifests as mortal and immortal.

To the best of my knowledge, this account of the *Puruṣasūkta* is the first testimony in the ṚV of an attempt to create a clear division between both aspects of reality and between the spheres of the cosmos. Such a division is implied in the earlier parts of the ṚV with use of conceptual metaphors the target domain of which is a tripartite whole, the middle sphere of which can be interpreted both as a symbol of darkness and as a symbol of light[39]. In the earlier hymns, however, the source domains are concepts connected with experience. Here this tripartite reality is conceived in abstract terms: of past and future (i.e. subjected to the power of time), of immortality and of what is beyond both states (see ṚV 10.129.2a: *ná mṛtyúr āsīd amṛ́taṃ ná tárhi*). The first two states constitute the manifest aspect, the third is the unmanifest one.

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[37] As we will see, this sphere will be thoroughly penetrated by the Upaniṣadic thinkers in their liberating practice, see chapter 4.4.

[38] This could be treated as specific instantiation of metonymy PLACE FOR EVENT (Radden, Kövecses 1999: 42). The word *amrtatvá* is used in ṚV 4.58.1 in this meaning (Jurewicz 2010a: 227–228).

[39] Treasure – treasury – mountain; bird – nestling – egg; milk – cow – its enclosure; milk – udder – cow (Jurewicz 2010a: 2010: 94–95).

In verse *d*, the composer explains the way reality becomes 'the master of immortality' (*amṛ̥tatvásyéśāno*). He conceives this process in terms of a living being which grows when it is well fed. This may occur in everyday feeding, but also during ritual when gods and men are fed with oblation. The name *púruṣa* used in reference to reality allows the composer to express the simultaneity of reality and of human transformations. Thus the essence of sacrifice is conceived in terms of eating. This interpretation conforms with the conceptualisation of the world in terms of a moving jaw (ṚV 10.90.1).

ṚV 10.90.3

etā́vān asya mahimā́ áto jyā́yāṃś ca pū́ruṣaḥ |
pā́do 'sya víśvā bhūtā́ni tripā́d asyāmṛ̥taṃ diví ||

So much is his greatness, but the Man is more than this;
a quarter of him is all living beings; three quarters are the immortal in heaven.

In verse *a*, the composer activates a spatial conceptualisation of the manifest aspect of reality which he presents as great. In this way, he implies that it can be measured, contrary to the unmanifest aspect which is immeasurable. Such a conceptualisation of the manifest aspect in the early stages of creation will be continued in later Indian philosophical thought[40]. In verse *b*, the poet states that reality as a whole is 'greater' (*jyā́yān*) than its manifest aspect. Thus, he proposes a panentheistic theory according to which the manifest aspect is only a part of the unmanifest whole.

In verses *c*–*d*, the composer evokes the concept of an animal (most probably a cow) of which only one leg can be seen and three are invisible. This conceptualisation can be activated if the recipient understands *padá* as 'leg' (not as 'quarter' as Jamison, Brereton propose). Activation of the experiential meaning allows the recipient to understand much more of the abstract content than the seemingly abstract meaning of part.

Again, two interpretations are possible here which are not mutually exclusive. In the first, all reality is conceived according to a zoomorphic model: the world is conceptualised in terms of legs of the cow while the unmanifest aspect of reality is conceptualised in terms of the body of the cow. According to the second, only the manifest aspect is conceived in terms of the zoomorphic model. The first interpretation logically follows from the first hemistich of the stanza which describes reality as greater than its manifest aspect. The second interpretation is activated *via* the expression *amṛ̥taṃ diví* ('the immortal in heaven', verse *d*). Most probably this expression refers to

[40] For the use of the concept of greatness in the AV see chapter 2.2.2.

the borderline sphere of the cosmos where immortality can be gained during life and after death thanks to ritual; this sphere is called *amrtatvá* in the previous stanza. The possibility to interpret the stanza equivocally may be caused by the composer wanting to express the idea that the state realised in the highest place of the sky opens the way to what is unmanifest and beyond any human condition, although this condition cannot be cognised and described by discursive categories.

The concept of a visible leg is the source domain for the *axis mundi* and three legs are hidden in the sun where the state of immortality can be realised. It should be noted that the Ṛgvedic composers believed that the *axis mundi* marked the sacrificial route between the earth and the sky: the oblations and the sacrificer go up it and the gods come to sit on the sacrificial grass, *barhís* (Jurewicz 2010a: 276 ff., 284). Thus understood the *axis mundi* is sometimes conceptualised in terms of a tree. This can be seen in the Āprī hymns of the ṚV where the sacrificial post (*yū́pa*), the ritual embodiment of the *axis mundi*, is called tree[41]. The concept of climbing a tree is also the source domain to conceive of cognition gained during sacrifice (ṚV 1.164.40-43, see section 1.6). It is also worth noting that the image of an animal standing on one leg with three legs up (a situation impossible from the point of view of everyday experience of course) is schematically similar to the image of a tree: one leg corresponds to the trunk, the three legs its branches.

Moreover, if the recipient elaborates the scenario of a jaw moving in speaking and eating, he will understand that the *axis mundi* stops this movement. According to Ṛgvedic beliefs, the *axis mundi* appeared in the morning and on its top the sun is raised (Jurewicz 2010a). According to the conceptualisation of the *Puruṣasūkta*, the midday is conceived as the moment when mouth is opened and cannot move. At the same time, as stated above, dynamism characterising the manifest aspect of reality is conceived in terms of constant eating and speaking. Thus the experience is again violated in order to express movement of what is immovable.

The concept of a cow is elaborated in ṚV 1.164.45 where speech is presented as divided into four footprints (*padá*) of which one is spoken by living beings and three are hidden (see section 1.6); the phonetic association between *padá* and *pā́da* reinforces the similarity of expositions of the two hymns. If the recipient evokes this conceptualisation of speech and blends it with the concept of manifestation of reality as the cosmos, he will understand that creation is conceived as manifestation of speech. The blending is justified in that speech is conceived in terms of a cow in the ṚV (ṚV 8.100.100-11,

[41] Potdar (1944–46, 1946–47), Bosch (1985).

10.101.9, it is elaborated in ṚV 1.164, see section 1.6). It is also justified on the ground of the *Puruṣasūkta* itself the composer of which evokes the concept of a moving jaw in the first stanza. We can see that all these meanings could not be grasped without activation of the experiential meaning of *pā́da* which is 'leg'. The input space of cow imparts to the blend topology, while the input space of speech imparts the cognitive nature of creative transformations of reality. The generic space of this blend is the image schema of SELF-MOTION.

ṚV 10.90.4

tripā́d ūrdhvá úd ait púruṣaḥ pā́do ऽsyehā́bhavat púnaḥ |
táto víṣvaṅ ví akrāmat sāśanānaśané abhí ||

With three quarters the Man went upwards, but a quarter of him came to be here again.
From there he strode out in different directions towards what eats and what does not eat.

In verses *a*–*b*, the composer elaborates the ontology presented in the previous stanza and highlights its dynamism with use of the image schema of VERTICALITY. It is implied that three parts of reality, which constitute the heavenly sphere of immortality and lead to what is unmanifest, are created in the upward movement and then the downward movement of one part of reality created the *axis mundi*.

The use of the verb *ví kram-* in verse *c* evokes the model of Footprints Of Viṣṇu whose activity is expressed with the same verb (ṚV 1.154.1,2). The recipient can also evoke this model on the basis of the phonetic resemblance between *pā́da* and *padá*. Since the main meaning of the model Footprints Of Viṣṇu is the sunrise, the activity of reality presented in verse *a* can be interpreted as sunrise. In such a case, there would be a difference in conceptualisation between the *Puruṣasūkta* and the model of Footprints Of Viṣṇu: according to the former, three parts (conceived in terms of legs) constitute the sky, while, according to the latter, three parts (conceived in terms of footprints) constitute the earth, the space and the sky (Jurewicz 2010a: 387 ff.).

However, in the *Puruṣasūkta*, the word *ví kram-* has a wider meaning than in the model of Footprints Of Viṣṇu. It is used to express the monism of two spheres of the manifest aspect: reality encompasses everything 'what eats and what does not eat' (*sāśanānaśané abhí*, verse *d*). Since immortality is gained thanks to eating, the recipient understands that the phrase 'what eats' refers to the borderline of the cosmos reached in sacrifices while 'what does not eat' is everything which is the food. Thus the opposition between immortality and mortality realised within the manifest aspect is again expressed. Verses

Dalsza część książki dostępna w wersji pełnej.